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ABSTRACT
While advances in digital information technology offer extraordinary
possibilities for the exploration and exploitation of literary and artistic expres-
sion, these advances also present unprecedented opportunities for intellectual
property ("IP") empowerment and the achievement of singular milestones in
copyright social justice. The ostensible conflict between copyright digital social
utility and digital commoditization has engendered a reemphasis upon the social
engineering obligations of the copyright law, and a search for copyright policies
which will harmonize these corrivallous objectives. Doctrinal constructions of
the copyright law which acknowledge the law's congenital social justice charac-
teristics, however, can achieve this equilibrium.
The revisualization of the copyright law as an engine for the socio-
economic advancement of marginalized communities, complimented by a con-
comitant respect for traditional copyright property interests, will enhance the
application of digital information technology to the cause of intellectual proper-
ty development, exploitation, and social empowerment. Such recognition of
copyright social utility/social justice interdependence, and the development of
affirmative mechanisms designed to promote more equitable access to the copy-
right infrastructure and to correct historical problems of copyright social injus-
tice, will ultimately produce a more diverse pool of stakeholders in the copy-
right property rights sub-regime. Accordingly, the promulgation of "Digital En-
trepreneurship" affirmative initiatives to promote grassroots copyright participa-
tion and empowerment will not only further the social justice agenda of the law,
but will also appropriately preserve its author incentive function and related
copyright social utility mechanisms in the digital information age.
Responsibly incorporated into the copyright regime, the copyright social
utility potential of digital information technology can be fulfilled. A socially
balanced approach to digital age copyright reveals intellectual property empo-
werment policy initiatives; it further suggests the construction of a fluid com-
pulsory license scheme, which should include a flexible royalty scale assessing
non-commercial, quasi-commercial, and commercial payment levies, buttressed
by an express unconscionablity mechanism, to symbiotically assure a progres-
sive response to digital copyright conflicts. "Digital Entrepreneurship" and other
[Vol. 112
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copyright social utility/social justice interdependence analyses and stratagems
can thus be applied toward easing some specific tensions among modern copy-
right constituencies, and bridging contemporary copyright social utility and
commoditization interests.
INTRODUCTION
With the advent of the digital information age there has been a refocus
of scholarly, policy, and professional attention toward the social utility and so-
cial justice obligations of the copyright law. Digital information technology has
provided unheralded opportunities for the development, dissemination, and ex-
ploitation of individual creative expression. Such technological advance has
made possible unprecedented access to copyrighted material through the Inter-
net and a variety of digital media formats. In addition, these advances have
enabled copyright end-users to engage in new forms of creative expression, not
only with respect to their own original expression, but through the reuse or "re-
mix" of pre-existing (and previously static) copyrighted material. In the context
of global culture, digital information technology presents attractive possibilities
for heretofore marginalized groups and cultures to share their indigenous crea-
tive expression, not only toward the education of outsiders about their aesthetic
customs and cultural beliefs, but also in the cause of economic independence
and socio-political empowerment.
Notwithstanding this plethora of artistic and educational boons, digital
information technology also presents formidable challenges to the social utility
structure of the copyright law. While many Americans now enjoy greater access
to the national (and multi-national) store of copyrighted works, due to a persis-
tent Digital Divide, other citizens remain isolated from such benefits, and in
some cases, their access to copyrighted works has actually diminished as digital
formats become the dominant medium for creative expression. Perhaps an even
greater challenge is posed to the copyright incentive scheme of authors' exclu-
sive property rights. Because of the ease in which end-users of copyrighted
works can now engage in the unauthorized digital use of such material, "digital
remix opportunities" pose a serious threat to the property rights of copyright
owners, undermining traditional copyright compensation expectations. Finally,
just as digital information technology proffers new avenues for the socially
beneficial exploration and use of marginalized indigenous cultural expression, it
also presents new methods for cultural pillaging and other unwelcome and ine-
quitable intrusions upon sacred and otherwise revered cultural practices and
belief systems.
These issues have engendered a refocus upon the social utility/social
justice objectives of the copyright law, as a means by which to resolve the Gor-
dian dilemmas they embody. In many cases, the problem is perceived as a direct
and often vitriolic conflict between the proponents of the copyright social bene-
fits that digital information technology can bestow upon society as a whole, and
those who favor the commoditization interests of individual copyright owners,
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particularly the commercial copyright industries. Consequently, resort to the
overarching social utility goals of the copyright law provides an appealing, per-
haps even compelling option for balancing these competing copyright objec-
tives. Indeed, even broader questions regarding digital and other dissemination
and exploitation of creative cultural expression outside the protection of the
copyright regime can be addressed through empathic invocation of the social
utility goals of the copyright law, by balancing society's interest in the expan-
sion of its store of aesthetic expression against the ultimate benefits that can be
gained by exercising appropriate respect for foreign and marginalized cultural
institutions and customs.
The West Virginia Law Review 2009 Symposium "Digital Entrepre-
neurship: The Incentives and Legal Risks" presents a valuable opportunity to
explore and formulate socially responsible strategies to resolve these issues in
compliance with the overarching goals of the copyright law. Persistent problems
of copyright social injustice can impede the social efficacy of the copyright law,
and thereby reveal a functional interdependence between copyright social utility
and copyright social justice. In acknowledging this interdependence, proactive
policies and strategies can be developed to promote symbiotic social jus-
tice/social utility mechanisms, and to encourage Digital Entrepreneurship (i.e.
the application of traditional entrepreneurial tenets in the cause of intellectual
property development and exploitation) to foster intellectual property empo-
werment and concomitant socio-economic advance. In addition to advancing
social justice, Digital Entrepreneurship principles also encourage ardent respect
for the copyright exclusive rights scheme and related property interests and in-
centives. This is so because fundamental entrepreneurial precepts favor the rec-
ognition of today's "copyright entrepreneurs" as tomorrow's "copyright vested
gentry," who will undoubtedly seek out and embrace the compensatory boons
attendant to copyright ownership.
In short, when viewed through the lens of copyright social utility/social
justice interdependence, and redressed through stratagems of Digital Entrepre-
neurship, the copyright disenfranchisement of marginalized groups and the so-
cially empowering but nonetheless unauthorized use of copyrighted material can
be addressed in concert with efforts to preserve the exclusive rights regime. Dig-
ital Entrepreneurship strategies align copyright social empowerment and author
incentive as mutually reinforcing, as opposed to mutually exclusive objectives,
and therefore advance the interests of all constituents in the digital copyright
community.
Analytical Schema
Part I of this essay will briefly discuss the inherent social utility man-
dates manifest within Article I, Section 8 of the Constitution, and the related
question of social justice imperatives implicated by the Copyright Clause. This
Part will recount how the courts and Congress have consistently worked to satis-
fy the social engineering directive of the Copyright Clause, through application
[Vol. 112
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of mechanisms such as the Fair Use Doctrine and legislative compulsory copy-
right license schemes, in the proper subordination of authors' property interests
in favor of society's broader cultural requirements. Notwithstanding these
proactive efforts to secure copyright social utility, however, the extent to which
a more expansive agenda of copyright social justice can or should be achieved
under the law has remained less clear.
Part ii will consequently explore the question of copyright social justice
as a Constitutional imperative. Digital information technology crystallizes the
contemporary commoditization versus societal social benefit conflict by redi-
recting scholarly attention toward the social utility mandate of the Copyright
Clause. Whereas the social utility function of the copyright law is generally ac-
cepted, however, the law's social justice obligations are less well defined. In
delineating a copyright social justice mandate, Part ii will begin by clarifying
the overlap/distinctions between social utility and social justice mechanisms,
defining mechanisms of social utility as initiatives designed to promote useful,
pragmatic social benefits to society, such as an increase in creative output, as
contrasted with mechanisms for social justice, which are generally intended to
effectuate pervasive fairness and equity. Digital information technology offers
unique social utility benefits, such as enhanced end-user access to and interac-
tion with copyrighted material, but it also holds the promise for equitable copy-
right access for all members of society. The prospects for such dual impact
boons provide a compelling context in which to assess the full social utili-
ty/social justice potential of copyright protection in the digital information age.
Against this backdrop, Part II will illustrate how obstruent problems of
copyright social injustice can impede the social efficacy of the copyright law,
and thereby reveal a functional interdependence between copyright social utility
and copyright social justice. When copyright social injustice interferes with
copyright social utility, the Copyright Clause mandates that the courts and Con-
gress take appropriate affirmative action to correct the pertinent social inequities
and deficiencies. In addition, Part Ii will demonstrate how the recognition of
copyright social utility/social justice interdependence can provide the basis for
affirmative copyright social justice policies and stratagems, and will accordingly
propose Digital Entrepreneurship as one such strategy through which the histor-
ically marginalized and underserved can achieve intellectual property empo-
werment.
Finally, Part III will explore Digital Entrepreneurship as an affirmative
Intellectual Property empowerment and social justice methodology. In essence,
Digital Entrepreneurship involves the application of traditional entrepreneurial
tenets and principles toward the cause of intellectual property development,
dissemination, and exploitation, and attunes these mechanisms to the social
utility/social justice function of the intellectual property law. As an engine for
copyright social justice, Digital Entrepreneurship promotes IP education, the
safeguarding of marginalized authors' IP property rights, and encourages the
entrepreneurial exploitation of intellectual property as means for socio-
economic advancement. As a tool for copyright social utility, Digital Entrepre-
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neurship eases the digital commoditization/social utility conflict, by providing
an analytical framework for a digital use compulsory license scheme. Part III
proffers that a copyright social utility/social justice interdependence approach to
the issue suggests the construction of a compulsory license scheme which (i)
assesses non-commercial, quasi-commercial, and commercial royalty rates; (ii)
balances the availability of suitable alternatives to unauthorized use and the sig-
nificance of the protected material to the unauthorized use; and (iii) evaluates
the apparent applicability of legitimate traditional copyright doctrines such as
Fair Use. In addition, the compulsory licensing scheme would include an ex-
press unconscionablity provision, to curtail the problem of adhesive and other-
wise unfair bargaining leverage, constructed specifically for the intellectual
property context, to better serve the overarching objectives of the copyright law.
Accordingly, the recognition of copyright social utility/social justice in-
terdependence and the implementation of concomitant Digital Entrepreneurship
strategies can effectuate the intellectual property empowerment and social ad-
vancement of previously marginalized groups, while advancing the overarching
goals of the copyright law. In this manner, digital information technology can be
exploited to its fullest in the achievement of the social utility and social justice
objectives of the copyright law, and the fulfillment of the law's ultimate social
engineering promise.
PART I. ACHIEVING THE SOCIAL UTILITY MANDATE OF THE COPYRIGHT LAW
A. Copyright Protection as a Social Engineering Tool
Article I, Section 8 of the Constitution expressly denotes copyright pro-
tection as a social engineering mechanism for advancing and shaping American
culture.' The literal Constitutional directive empowers Congress to adopt laws
to promote the arts and sciences, so as to advance cultural and technological
I U.S. CONST. art. 1, § 8. cl. 8 (bestowing upon Congress the authority "To promote the
Progress of Science and useful Arts, by securing for limited Times to Authors and Inventors the
exclusive Right to their respective Writings and Discoveries."). See generally Stacy F. McDonald,
Copyright for Sale: How the Commodification of Intellectual Property Distorts the Social Bargain
Implicit in the Copyright Clause, 50 How. L.J. 541, 542-43 (2007) ("Article I, Section 8, Clause 8
of the U.S. Constitution, often called the Copyright Clause, empowers Congress to grant creators a
limited monopoly over their works, both as an incentive to and reward for creating new works. In
exchange. the public benefits from the dissemination of and access to the work while it is pro-
tected and, later, from an enriched and abundant public domain once the copyright expires. Thus,
the Copyright Clause facilitates what is, in effect, a social bargain that seeks to achieve what the
Framers envisioned as one of the primary goals of copyright: the promotion of learning."); Ed-
ward T. Saadi, Sound Recordings Need Sound Protection, 5 TEx. INTELL. PROP. L.J. 333, 335-36
(1997) ("The United States Constitution explicitly grants to Congress the power to pass laws
governing copyright. The purpose behind this grant of authority is to encourage the creation of
works of artistic and scientific value by providing the incentive of an exclusive monopoly over the
benefits of that creation for a limited time .... The congressional purpose in granting these exclu-
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achievement, and to amend such laws as necessary to ensure their continued
efficacy .2
With respect to the copyright law, specific, exclusive property rights are
afforded to authors under the Copyright Act as a means by which to spur artistic
endeavor.3 At the same time, however, corollary rights and privileges to make
2 See Harper & Row, Publishers, Inc. v. Nation Enters., 471 U.S. 539, 558 (1985) ("'The
economic philosophy behind the clause empowering Congress to grant patents and copyrights is
the conviction that encouragement of individual effort by personal gain is the best way to advance
public welfare through the talents of authors and inventors in 'Science and useful Arts."' (quoting
Mazer v. Stein, 347 U.S. 201. 219 (1954))): 1 PAuL GOLDSTEIN, COPYRIGHT § 1.14 (2d ed. 2002)
[hereinafter GOLDSTEIN]: 4 MELVILLE B. NIMMER & DAVID NIMMER, NIMMER ON COPYRIGHT §
8.01[A] (Matthew Bender ed., rev. ed. 2002) [hereinafter NIMMER & NIMMER]; Scott L. Bach,
Music Recording, Publishing, and Compulsory Licenses: Toward a Consistent Copyright Law, 14
HOFSTRA L. REV. 379, 383 (1986) ("The limited monopoly policy of copyright law arises from ...
the Constitution .... Underlying the [copyright clause] is the principle that society will be harmed
if artists are not given exclusive rights to exploit their works for a limited time, because the lack of
such rights would discourage artistic creativity. Thus, granting a limited monopoly in copyright
advances the public interest because it encourages artists to create through the prospect of finan-
cial gain. The eventual termination of the monopoly assures the public good. because it allows the
assimilation of artistic works into society, which is the ultimate objective of copyright law.")
(citations omitted); Justin Hughes, The Philosophy of Intellectual Property, 77 GEO. L.J. 287, 291
(1988) ("Intellectual property is often the propertization of what we call "talent."'); Jason S.
Rooks, Constitutionality of Judicially-Imposed Compulsory Licenses in Copyright Infringement
Cases, 3 J. INTELL. PROP. L. 255. 257 (1995) ("Read literally, three fundamental policies are ad-
vanced by the [copyright] clause: (1) to promote learning ... ; (2) to benefit authors ... ; and (3)
to ensure public access .... Of these three policies, two benefit the public and one the author: and
the benefit to the author is a means to the ends of promoting learning and protecting the public
domain.").
3 See, e.g., Harper & Row, 471 U.S. at 546-47 ("Section 106 of the Copyright Act confers a
bundle of exclusive rights to the owner of the copyright. Under the Copyright Act, these rights
to publish. copy. and distribute the author's work vest in the author of an original work from
the time of its creation. In practice, the author commonly sells his rights to publishers who offer
royalties in exchange for their services in producing and marketing the author's work.") (footnotes
and citations omitted); Sony Corp. of Am. v. Universal Studios, Inc., 464 U.S. 417, 429 (1984);
GOLDSTEIN, supra note 2, at § 1.14; Michael G. Anderson & Paul F. Brown, The Economics Be-
hind Copyright Fair Use: A Principled and Predictable Body of Law, 24 Loy. U. CHI. L.J. 143,
158-59 (1993) ("Copyright law vests a bundle of rights in the creator of certain kinds of intellec-
tual property .... Copyright law, both ancient and modern, is founded on the fundamental, though
perhaps implicit, notion that adverse economic incentives are created if unrestricted [use] of intel-
lectual products is permitted. When adverse incentives exist, society will not have as much crea-
tive innovation as it wishes to encourage. Therefore, the emphasis of copyright law is on the bene-
fits derived by the public from the creative efforts of authors. Reward to copyright owners or
authors is a necessary but secondary consideration.") (citations omitted); Lateef Mtima, Tasini
and Its Progeny: The New Exclusive Right or Fair Use on the Electronic Publishing Frontier?, 14
FORDIHAM INTELL. PROP. MEDIA & ENT. L.J. 369, 396 98 (2004) [hereinafter Tasini and Its Proge-
ny] ("Pursuant to article 1, Congress has the power '[t]o promote the Progress of Science and
useful Arts, by securing for limited Times to Authors and Inventors the exclusive Right to their
respective Writings and Discoveries . . . .' In accordance with this constitutional mandate, both
Congress and the courts have determined that the 'overarching object of copyright law in the
United States is to encourage the widest possible production and dissemination of literary and
artistic works.' Through widespread production and dissemination, the greatest amount of creative
works are likely to reach the largest audience, who will not only benefit from exposure to these
7
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use of copyrighted material are reserved to the public.4 Together, the recognized
rights and interests of authors and the public are intended to form a synergistic
framework to effectuate the social utility objectives of the Intellectual Property
Clause.5
Whereas Congress has responsibility for adopting and maintaining a
copyright legal regime, it falls to the courts to ensure that the system of com-
plementary author/public rights and privileges is interpreted and applied such
that the copyright social utility equipoise remains in proper alignment. 6 Judicial
interpretation and application of the copyright law to specific disputes and con-
works, but who will in turn build upon the ideas advanced therein and produce additional
work .... In order to achieve such widespread dissemination of creative works, however, there
must first be an abundant supply of creative works to disseminate. Consequently, creative artists
must have proper incentive to produce these works .... Congress may provide such incentive by
granting authors the 'exclusive right' to their works. By securing to authors property rights in
connection with their works, the copyright law provides a means by which authors might profit
financially from their efforts and thereby provides them with the necessary inducement to under-
take and continue their creative labors."); cf NIMMER & NIMMER, supra note 2, at § 14.03 (dis-
cussing the copyright owner's remedies with respect to the infringer's profits).
4 See, e.g., Kelly v. Arriba Soft Corp., 336 F.3d 811, 817 (9th Cir. 2003) ("A claim of copy-
right infringement is subject to certain statutory exceptions, including the fair use exception.");
Dr. Seuss Enters., L.P. v. Penguin Books USA, Inc., 109 F.3d 1394, 1399 (9th Cir. 1997) ("[The
Fair Use Doctrine] permits courts to avoid rigid application of the copyright statute when, on
occasion, it would stifle the very creativity which that law is designed to foster."). See generally 1.
Fred Koenigsberg, Lines of Defense: An Analytic Framework for the Defense of Copyright In-
fringement. Landslide, Vol. 1, No. 5. p. 36. 39-40 (May/June 2009).
5 See, e.g., Steven D. Jamar, Copyright and the Public Interest from the Perspective of Brown
v. Board of Education, 48 How. L.J. 629, 639 (2005) ("The Copyright Act creates a number of
rights that attach to original works of authorship fixed in a tangible medium of expression. But,
many of those rights are subject to limitations and exceptions in the Copyright Act itself for rea-
sons of public policy. These limitations serve to balance some of the competing interests among
creators, owners, marketers, users, consumers, and others. In some instances, the limitations affect
the public interest in developing information and advancing the arts and sciences. That is, Con-
gress decided that the rights should be limited and various uses that would otherwise infringe
should be permitted. These limitations do not result in the works being put in the public domain,
but they do make lawful certain uses of the works that would otherwise be infringing."); Tasini
and Its Progeny, supra note 3. at 400 01 ("In this way, the copyright law fulfills the constitutional
objective of the promotion of the arts and sciences. The mechanism of exclusive rights secures
authors with property rights in their creative works, and thereby provides them with the opportuni-
ty for financial gain, the secular incentive to create. This incentive assures an abundance of crea-
tive works and 'reflects the belief that property rights [in creative works], properly limited, will
serve the general public interest in an abounding national culture.' Finally, the mechanism of
exclusive rights is 'properly limited' or counterbalanced by the fact that outside of the exclusive
rights, the public is free to use, enjoy. and build upon an author's copyrighted work, thereby 'al-
low[ing] others to draw [up]on these works in their own creative and educational activities."').
6 See, e.g., Marci A. Hamilton, Copyright at the Supreme Court: A Jurisprudence of Defe-
rence, 47 J. COPYRIGHT Soc'Y U.S.A. 317, 319-21 (2000) ("Elements of the [Supreme] Court's...
interpretation of the Copyright Clause . . . includ[e] an emphasis on the public good that forces
author's rights to be conditioned by the public .... From the first case, through the present, the
Court has treated copyright law as positive law, the parameters of which are determined by the
Congress ([as] limited by the Constitution's strictures).").
[Vol. 112
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troversies often clarifies the legal rights and interests created under the Copy-
right Act, and further assure that the law's policy goals are not only achieved,
but adapted to contemporary challenges.' Thus, both Congress and the courts
have independent albeit complimentary responsibilities to ensure that the copy-
right law serves to promote the development, use, and exploitation of artistic
expression and to thereby satisfy the copyright social engineering directive set
forth in the Constitution.
B. Preserving Copyright Social Utility in the Courts: The Fair Use Doc-
trine
Throughout the history of American copyright, the affirmative efforts of
Congress and the courts to preserve the social utility function of the copyright
law have been directed principally at preventing the author incentive/property
right mechanisms from impeding the fundamental purpose of copyright protec-
tion, that of promoting literary and artistic endeavor. 8 Early in the development
7 See Sarah Deutsch, Fair Use in Copyright Law and the Nonprofit Organization: A Proposal
for Reform. 34 AM. U. L. REV. 1327, 1351 n.170 (1985); Dennis S. Karjala, Harry Potter, Tanya
Grotter, and the Copyright Derivative Work, 38 ARIz. ST. L.J. 17. 34 35 (2006); Lydia Pallas
Loren. Digitization, Commodification, Criminalization: The Evolution of Criminal Copyright
Infringement and the Importance of the Willfulness Requirement, 77 WASH. U. L.Q. 835, 888-89
(1999) [hereinafter Digitization, Commodification, Criminalization]; Michael Spink, Authors
Stripped of Their Electronic Rights in Tasini v. New York Times Co., 32 J. MARSHALL L. REV.
409, 420 (1999).
8 See, e.g., Lydia Pallas Loren, Untangling the Web of Afusic Copyrights, 53 CASE W. RES. L.
REV. 673, 675 (2003) [hereinafter Untangling the Web] ("The fundamental purpose of copyright
law is to promote the progress of knowledge and learning. Thus, examining the reasons to provide
a preference for the author over the public becomes critical."); McDonald, supra note 1, at 543-44
("After recent years of litigation and legislation, fueled by rapid technological change, instead of a
social bargain, 'we now survey a battlefield that pits private interests against the public good.'...
One cause of these copyright battles is a commodification mentality, a subtle, yet acute, shift in
the conceptualization of copyright law that has upset the balance. When viewed through this
commodification lens, a copyrighted work looks like an 'undifferentiated product,' such as wheat
or oil, whose market value stems solely from the owner's right to sell it. A copyrighted work be-
comes valued for its profitability, rather than its contribution to education, public discourse, or
intellectual enlightenment. [T]he commodification of intellectual property distorts the copyright
balance by valuing a copyrighted work for its market potential over, above, and to the exclusion of
its non-economic values. Rather simplistically, the content industry believes that the public is
benefited solely because the products are on the market, ready for mass consumption. This com-
modification mentality excises from the equation the social bargain inherent in the Copyright
Clause, as well as what the Framers considered to be the goals of the copyright system.") L. Ray
Patterson, Copyright and "The Exclusive Right" of Authors, I J. INTELL. PROP. L. 1, 41-42 (1993)
("One's conclusion as to the nature of copyright is determined by one's view of its source. A cohe-
rent and consistent view of copyright requires that the source be Congress, which can grant the
author only the right to publish and vend, with only such extensions as do not subordinate consti-
tutional policies to the cause of private profit. The point is that copyright law is more regulatory
than proprietary in nature, for only the regulatory concept makes any sense in view of the three
policies that the Copyright Clause mandates: promotion of learning, protection of the public do-
main, and benefit to the author.").
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of American copyright, the courts recognized an inherent public privilege to
make "fair use" of copyrighted works, and thus to intrude upon a copyright
owner's exclusive property rights for the purpose of educational and literary
discourse and comment. 9 The judicially created Fair Use Doctrine has since
developed into the predominant juridical tool for balancing author property
rights against the social utility demands of the copyright law. 10
The Fair Use Doctrine is an "equitable doctrine [which] permits other
people to use copyrighted material without the owner's consent in a reasonable
manner for certain purposes."'1 The Fair Use Doctrine enables the copyright law
to account for those situations in which a specific unauthorized use of copy-
righted material will have little to no impact upon the author's overall incen-
tive/compensation interests, and the social utilities to be achieved in permitting
the use warrants a limited intrusion upon the copyright holder's exclusive prop-
erty rights. '
2
9 See 17 U.S.C. § 107 (2002); Folsom v. Marsh, 9 F. Cas. 342, 349 (C.C.D. Mass. 1841) (No.
4901); Pierre N. Leval, Toward a Fair Use Standard, 103 IIARV. L. REv. 1105. 1105 (1990) [he-
reinafter Fair Use Standard] ("Not long after the creation of the copyright law by the Statute of
Anne of 1709, courts recognized that certain instances of unauthorized reproduction of copy-
righted material, first described as 'fair abridgment,' later 'fair use,' would not infringe the au-
thor's rights. In the United States, the doctrine was received and eventually incorporated into the
Copyright Act of 1976 .... ); see also Harper & Row, 471 U.S. at 549 ("Fair use was traditional-
ly defined as 'a privilege in others than the owner of the copyright to use the copyrighted material
in a reasonable manner without his consent.' . . . The statutory formulation of the defense of fair
use in the Copyright Act reflects the intent of Congress to codify the common law doctrine.")
(citations omitted).
10 See, e.g., Sega Enters. Ltd. v. Accolade, Inc.. 977 F.2d 1510, 1520 27 (9th Cir. 1992); Mad-
ison River Mgmt. Co. v. Bus. Mgmt. Software Corp.. 387 F. Supp. 2d 521. 535 37 (M.D.N.C.
2005);.Fair Use Standard, supra note 9, at 1105: Pamela Samuelson, Fair Use for Computer
Programs and Other Copyrightable Works in Digital Form: The Implications of Sony, Galoob
and Sega, I J. INTELL. PROP. L. 49, 51 (1993) [hereinafter Fair Use for Computer Programs]
("Fair use has historically served as a flexible and adaptable mechanism for balancing the interests
of copyright owners, their competitors or potential competitors, and the public to fulfill the larger
purposes of copyright law which have traditionally been understood to be promoting the produc-
tion and dissemination of knowledge.").
I Campbell v. Acuff-Rose Music, Inc., 510 U.S. 569, 574-77 (1994); Sony Corp. of Am. v.
Universal City Studios, Inc., 464 U.S. 417, 448-51 (1984); SunTrust Bank v. Houghton Mifflin
Co., 268 F.3d 1257, 1264 (11 th Cir. 2001); Rogers v. Koons, 960 F.2d 301, 308 (2d Cir.1992);
Sega Enters., 977 F.2d at 1522; Fair Use Standard, supra note 9, at 1127 ("Fair use was a judge-
made utilitarian limit on a statutory right. It balances the social benefit of a transformative second-
ary use against injury to the incentives of authorship."); Field v. Google. Inc.. 412 F. Supp. 2d
1106, 1117 (D. Nev. 2006) ("The fair use doctrine 'creates a limited privilege in those other than
the owner of a copyright to use the copyrighted material in a reasonable manner without the own-
er's consent,' . . . and 'permits courts to avoid rigid application of the copyright statute when, on
occasion, it would stifle the very creativity which that law is designed to foster.'") (citations omit-
ted); I. FRED KOENIGSBERG, Copyrights, in UNDERSTANDING BASIC COPYRIGHT LAW 2002, at 147-
48 (PLI Patents, Copyrights, Trademarks, and Literary Prop., Course Handbook Series No. GO-
010T 2002): N11VIER & NIMMER. supra note 2, at § 13.05.
12 See, e.g., 2 PAUL GOLDSTEIN, COPYRIGHT, § 10.2.1 (2d ed. 2002) ("At the highest level of
generalization, [fair] uses characteristically involve situations in which the social, political and
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The Fair Use Doctrine is one of the salient mechanisms through which
the overarching policy objectives of the copyright law are attained, including the
broadest use and dissemination of creative works toward the greater public
good.13 The Fair Use Doctrine ensures that the author's property incentive me-
chanism does not overshadow important societal interests in particular cases
wherein the author's property interests should be subordinated to the social utili-
ty needs of society as a whole. 14
cultural benefits of the use will outweigh any consequent losses to the copyright proprietor, and in
which the time and expense of negotiations - or, in [certain cases], the unwillingness of the
copyright owner to permit these uses at an acceptable price - will often foreclose a negotiated
transaction.") NINMER & NIMMER, supra note 2. at § 13.05[A][1]; Sharon Appel, Copyright,
Digitization of images, and Art Museums: Cyberspace and Other New Frontiers, 6 UCLA ENT. L.
REv. 150, 174-75 (1999) ("The ultimate purpose of American copyright law is plainly stated in
the Constitution. The law exists 'to promote the progress of science and the useful arts' or, in
plain, contemporary English, to promote the advancement of society at large. While the same
clause ... also grants to authors of creative works the right to enjoy the financial fruits of their
labors, the plain language of the clause evidences that this grant of monopoly is subservient to the
primary goal of promoting the progress of society as a whole. The Patent and Copyright Clause
thus reflects a tension between the right of the public to have access to creative works and the
right of authors of creative works to benefit financially from their efforts. The plain language of
the clause, however, resolves this tension in favor of the public."); Fair Use for Computer Pro-
grams. supra note 10. at 56 57 ("Courts have often relied upon fair use to resolve disputes when
recognition of broad rights in publishers or authors would have frustrated achievement of the
societal purposes of copyright law. In the American tradition, the ultimate purpose of copyright is
not the maximization of financial rewards to copyright owners ... but fostering the creation and
dissemination of literary and artistic works in order to enhance the public's access to knowledge.
The grant of exclusive rights to authors enabling them to reap a portion of the value derived from
their creative contributions is a means to this larger end.") (footnotes omitted).
13 See Appel, supra note 12, at 167 ("[Exclusive] rights constitute the 'bundle of rights' that
comprise copyright. Thus, they constitute the core of copyright protection. However, the Copy-
right Act also sets forth several limitations upon the exclusive rights. The most important of these
... is the doctrine of fair use, which permits unauthorized use of a copyrighted work where such
use, as a matter of public policy, is 'fair.' The statutory provision regarding fair use provides that:
'the fair use of a copyrighted work including such use .. .for purposes such as criticism, com-
ment, news reporting, teaching ... scholarship or research is not an infringement of copyright."')
(footnote omitted).
14 See, e.g., Fair Use Standard, supra note 9. at 1107 ("The Supreme Court has often and
consistently summarized the objectives of copyright law. The copyright is not an inevitable, di-
vine, or natural right that confers on authors the absolute ownership of their creations. It is de-
signed rather to stimulate activity and progress in the arts for the intellectual enrichment of the
public."). As it would be unworkable to predetermine a list of all circumstances in which the
equitable social utilities outweigh the copyright holder's interest in denying or restricting the use
of his or her work, courts instead weigh four factors in evaluating whether an unauthorized use
should be permitted as a fair use. In 1976, Congress codified the Fair Use Doctrine as Section 107
of the Copyright Act, setting forth therein the four non-exclusive Fair Use factors: (1) the purpose
and the character of the use, such as whether it is primarily commercial in nature or if it is a trans-
formative use, that is, a use that enhances or builds upon original use for the copyrighted work; (2)
the nature of the copyrighted work involved, that is. whether it is primarily a creative work such
as a fiction novel or a factual work such as a biography; (3) the amount and substantiality of the
work used without the author's permission; and (4) the effect that allowing the unauthorized use is
likely to have upon the market for the copyrighted work. 17 U.S.C. § 107; Campbell v. Acuff-
11
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The Fair Use Doctrine can be particularly important in the context of
new technological uses for copyrighted works. When a new technological use
for copyrighted material is introduced, it can obscure the boundary between
authors' exclusive rights and the rights and privileges necessarily reserved to the
public.1 5 This is sometimes the case because it may not be immediately clear as
to whether the new technological use replicates one of the enumerated exclusive
rights. 16 Even where the new use clearly encompasses an exclusive right, how-
ever, the overarching social utilities which underlie copyright protection may
warrant a public privilege to participate in the new use. 17 In many new technol-
Rose Music, Inc., 510 U.S. 569, 574-77 (1994); Sony Corp. of Am., 464 U.S. at 498-99; Harper
& Row, 471 U.S. at 549; Kelly v. Arriba Soft Corporation, 336 F.3d 811, 817-18 (9th Cir. 2003);
Sega Enters., 977 F.2d at 1522.
15 Jamar, supra note 5, at 650-51 ("We live in a quicksilver technological environment with
courts ill-suited to fix the flow of internet innovation .... The introduction of new technology is
always disruptive to old markets, and particularly to those copyright owners whose works are sold
through well-established distribution mechanisms. Yet, history has shown that time and market
forces often provide equilibrium in balancing interests, whether the new technology be a player
piano. a copier, a tape recorder, a video recorder, a personal computer. a karaoke machine, or an
MP3 player. Thus, it is prudent for courts to exercise caution before restructuring liability theories
for the purpose of addressing specific market abuses, despite their apparent present magnitude.");
Wendy M. Pollack, Note, Tuning In: The Future of Copyright Protection for Online Music in the
Digital Millennium, 68 FORDHAM L. REV. 2445, 2445 (2000) ("Since the advent of the Gutenberg
printing press, copyright law and technology have been entangled in an ongoing legal chase. In
order to advance the quintessential goal of American copyright law .... Congress constantly must
balance the law's objectives: to promote widespread dissemination of original creative works,
while providing incentives to authors and owners to create such works. New technological ad-
vances continuously upset this balance by facilitating the ability to copy works without permission
from copyright holders .... However, as developments such as radio, television, and video have
demonstrated, worries over the demise of copyright protection have been overstated. In fact, such
technological developments usually have been met with a ceaseless round of amendments to the
United States copyright laws.") (footnotes omitted).
16 See, e.g., Teleprompter Corp. v. Columbia Broad. Sys.. Inc., 415 U.S. 394, 408 (1974)
(whether unauthorized cable transmission of copyrighted broadcasts violates the reproduction and
distribution rights); Fortnightly Corp. v. United Artists Television, Inc., 392 U.S. 390, 398-400
(1968); Perfect 10, Inc. v. Amazon.com, Inc., 487 F.3d 701, 717-18 (1 th Cir. 2007); MAI Sys-
tems Corp. v. Peak Computer, Inc., 991 F.2d 511, 518 (9th Cir. 1993); Advance Magazine Pub-
lishers Inc. v. David Leach, 466 F. Supp. 2d 628, 637 (D. Md. 2006); 1-800 Contacts, Inc. v.
Whenu.com, 309 F. Supp. 2d 467. 485 86 (S.D.N.Y. 2003); Michaels v. Internet Entm't Group,
Inc.. 5 F. Supp. 2d 823, 830 31 (C.D. Ca. 1998); Sega Enters. v. MAPHIA, 948 F. Supp. 923, 927
(N.D. Cal. 1996): Religious Tech. Ctr. v. Lerma, 1996 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 15454, 2 5 (E.D. Va.
1996): Playboy Enterprises, Inc. v. Frena, 839 F. Supp. 1552. 1556 57 (M.D. Fla. 1993) (discuss-
ing unauthorized computer screen display violates the display right);
17 See, e.g., Kelly, 336 F.3d at 820 (discussing the public interest in the development of an
effective search engine index for use in locating copyright images on the Internet); Tasini and Its
Progeny. supra note 3. at 435 ("In evaluating a fair use claim ... the interests of the unauthorized
[user]. particularly those of individual commercial gain, are all but eliminated from the balancing
equation - if not weighed against allowing the [unauthorized] use. Instead, the salient interests
at stake are those of the public with respect to the social utility of creative works versus the com-
pensation expectations of the author. Given the primacy of the public interest ... it is conceivable
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ogical use copyright disputes, it will initially fall to the courts to clarify or deli-
neate the contours of the copyright owner's property rights, or otherwise bal-
ance the competing social utilities.18 In these situations, courts often rely upon
the Fair Use Doctrine to realign the respective rights and expectations of authors
and the public in connection with a particular new use for copyrighted materi-
al. 19
C. Fair Use and Unauthorized Digital Use of Copyrighted Material
Almost from the very outset of the proliferation of digital information
technology it posed a formidable threat to copyright owner property right expec-
that the interjection of that interest could tip the balance in favor of permitting a detrimental im-
pact upon the copyright holder's commercial interests .... ").
18 See Jon M. Garon, Normative Copyright: A Conceptual Frameworkfor Copyright Philoso-
phy and Ethics, 88 CORNELL L. REV. 1278, 1309-10 (2003) ("The role of the common law and
legislature is to balance property and liability interests .... If all property is subject to the legal
balance between the exclusive owner and the public, then intellectual property is merely the realm
in which the balancing is most explicitly acknowledged .... The Supreme Court has repeatedly
recognized the power of Congress to adjust the balance of rights between authors, publishers, and
the public .... The normative question is not whether such balancing can take place. but how to
create a reasoned framework for setting or shifting the balance." (footnotes omitted)); Jessica
Litman, The Exclusive Right to Read, 13 CARDOZO ARTS & ENT. L.J. 29, 39 (1994) ("It is difficult
for intellectual property laws to keep pace with technology. When technological advances cause
ambiguity in the law, courts rely on the law's purposes to resolve that ambiguity. However, when
technology gets too far ahead of the law, and it becomes difficult and awkward to apply the old
principles, it is time for reevaluation and change. 'Even though the 1976 Copyright Act was
carefully drafted to be flexible enough to be applied to future innovations, technology has a habit
of outstripping even the most flexible statutes.' The coat is getting a little tight. There is no need
for a new one, but the old one needs a few alterations." (quoting H.R. REP. No.101-735. at 7
(1990)): Robert H. Thornburg. The Presumption Against Implied Transfer of Electronic Rights in
Licenses Under Section 201(c) of the 1976 Copyright Act: A New Right for the Bundle, 2002 U.
ILL. J.L. TECH. & POL'Y 235, 237 (2002) ("While copyright vests appropriate rights in an author in
order to compensate her for her labor, it also seeks to protect the public from unreasonable sei-
zures of works already in the public domain.").
19 For example in Sony Corp. of America, 464 U.S. at 417, the case involved a classic "new
technological use" copyright challenge. The Sony case presented a new technological use prob-
lem, but from an atypical posture. In a typical Fair Use case, a finding that an authorized use qual-
ifies as a Fair Use applies only to the parties and activity specifically before the court, although
subsequent unauthorized users can invoke the court's determination as precedent. In Sony. howev-
er, instead of being asked to assess a particular instance of unauthorized activity, the court was
effectively asked to categorize generally an activity as either author exclusive or as a Fair Use.
Despite the unusual litigation sequence pursued in the resolution of the issue, however, the ulti-
mate legal impact of the decision is the same: members of the public who engage in unauthorized
time-shifting can rely upon the Fair Use Doctrine to shield their conduct from copyright liability.
In many respects, the analysis in Sony is more reminiscent of that undertaken when a copyright
compulsory license is under consideration, where the unauthorized use is being evaluated with
respect to its importance to the copyright social utility objectives as a whole. As discussed in the
next sub-section, in these situations. Congress must determine the appropriate copyright allocation
of a use that is important to the author incentive mechanism of the copyright law, but as to which
widespread engagement is equally vital to the cause of society's cultural advancement.
13
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tations.2 ° One of the earliest judicial resolutions in this ongoing conflict be-
tween the author's exclusive rights and the public's desire to explore digital use
of copyrighted material was undertaken by the Ninth Circuit in Kelly v. Arriba
Soft Corp.2 1 The defendant Arriba had compiled a searchable database of more
than two million "thumbnail images,," that is, reduced versions of images that
were already available on the Internet at various web sites. By utilizing defen-
dant's search engine, the Arriba Vista Image Searcher, a user could retrieve a
visual index of the thumbnail images, which also contained hyper links to the
full size images at the originating web sites. By clicking on a thumbnail image,
the user could automatically link to the web site where the original image ac-
tually resided, and among other things, could then see the full size version of the
image and either the originating web site's web address or the actual originating
22web page.
The plaintiff Kelly was the owner of one of the originating web sites
and some of the copyrighted images re-created as thumbnails in Arriba's data-
base. Among other things, Kelly claimed that Arriba's unauthorized use of his
images to create the thumbnails and the search engine data base constituted un-
authorized engagement in his exclusive reproduction and derivative work
rights.23
In response to Kelly's copyright infringement claims, Arriba invoked
the Fair Use Doctrine. With regard to the first Fair Use factor, the court found
Arriba's use to be only "incidentally commercial":
20 See Lateef Mtima, The Changing Landscape of Internet Use and Dissemination of Copy-
righted Works: New Tools, New Rules, or the Same Old Regime?, THE COMPUTER & INTERNET L.,
Vol. 24 at 4 (Oct. 2007) ("Up until the digital technological revolution, the ... division between
the copyright holder's exclusive rights and the public uses and privileges worked relatively well.
Copyright owners routinely granted assignments and licenses of their exclusive rights to commer-
cial users of their work, such as publishers who wished to make multiple copies and distribute
them for sale to the public. In as much as authors thereby authorized only the sale of individual
copies of their works to the general public, they granted the public no right to engage in any 106
exclusive rights' activities (such as making copies) in connection with the authors' works ....
Notwithstanding the copyright division of authors' rights and public privileges, however, the real
reason that members of the public were not likely to infringe upon a copyright holder's exclusive
rights.., was one of basic practicality. Making multiple copies and/or engaging in the mass distri-
bution of copyrighted material was an expensive undertaking, and one that was difficult to con-
ceal. With the advent of digital technology, however, the practical obstacles to surreptitious copy-
right infringement largely disappeared. Today, possession of a single digital copy enables repro-
duction and distribution of a copyrighted work to an infinite number of people - and all from the
privacy of a personal laptop.").
21 77 F. Supp. 2d 1116 (C.D. Cal. 1999), modified, 336 F.3d 811 (9th Cir. 2003).
22 Kelly, 336 F.3d at 815 16: see also Parker v. Google. 242 Fed Appx. 833, 834 35 (3d Cir.
2007).
23 Kelly, 336 F.3d at 815-16. In addition, Plaintiff Kelly also claimed that the unauthorized
hyper link constituted copyright infringement, and that because the thumbnail images did not
reproduce the attendant copyright notices from the originating web site, they were also in viola-
tion of the Digital Millennium Copyright Act. See generally id.
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There is no dispute Defendant operates its Web site for com-
mercial purposes. Plaintiffs images, however, did not
represent a significant element of that commerce, nor were they
exploited in any special way. They were reproduced as a result
of Defendant's generally indiscriminate method of gathering
images .... so it can provide more complete results to the users
of its search engine .... While the use here was commercial, it
was also of a somewhat more incidental and less exploitative
nature than more traditional types of 'commercial use' .24
Moreover, the court held that Arriba's use was socially beneficial and therefore
transformative:
The most significant factor favoring Defendant is the transfor-
mative nature of its use of Plaintiffs images .... Plaintiff s
photographs are artistic works used for illustrative purposes.
Defendant's visual search engine is designed to catalog and im-
prove access to images on the Internet .... The character of
the thumbnail index is not esthetic, but functional; its purpose is
not to be artistic, but to be comprehensive.2 5
24 Kelly. 77 F. Supp. 2d at 1119: aff'd 336 F.3d 818 20; see also Tasini and Its Progeny, supra
note 3. at 436-41 ("Under the first [Fair Use] factor, notwithstanding the publishers' commercial
objectives, there is also a compelling public interest in digital archiving and dissemination that
could outweigh the contributing copyright holder's ancillary commercial interests. Despite the
importance of the author's remunerative rights, ensuring digital dissemination of previously pub-
lished printed works provides a vital public benefit .... Finally, in so far as the fourth fair use
factor is concerned . . . the existence or extent of stand-alone digital re-publication markets for
individual contributory works remains debatable. Prior to the development and proliferation of
digital information technology, the market for re-publication of contributory works was li-
mited .... It is likely that few if any of the contributory articles in many popular collective works
have any digital re-publication market beyond their role in making a digital archive complete ....
If there is no genuine stand-alone market for digital re-publication of certain contributory articles,
then the fourth fair use factor weighs in favor of allowing digital re-publication of those articles as
part of the collective works in which they appear, lest the public interest in digital archives be
denied to preserve an illusory interest on the part of freelance copyright holders.") But cf Perfect
10 v. Google. Inc., 416 F. Supp. 2d 828. 847 (C.D. Ca. 2006) (finding that the creation of "thumb-
nails" that are almost the same size as the originals is not a Fair Use: "Merely because Google's
thumbnails are not cropped does not necessarily make them exact copies of PlO's images. but the
record currently before the Court does suggest that the thumbnails here closely approximate. a key
function of Pl0's full-size originals, at least to the extent that viewers of PIO's photos of nude
women pay little attention to fine details.").
25 Kelly. 77 F. Supp. 2d at 1119, aff'd 336 F.3d 818 19: see also Ticketmaster v. Tickets.com,
2000 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 4553 (C.D. Cal. 2000) (unauthorized hyper link does not constitute per se
infringement); Niels B. Schaumann, An Artist's Privilege, 15 CARDOZO ARTS & ENT. L. J. 249,
267 (1997) ("Courts and commentators in recent years have stressed the idea that to be fair, a use
should be 'transformative.' A transformative use constitutes creative departure from the original
work. Access to such a creative departure is presumably in the public interest; if the use meets this
15
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Consequently, the court ruled that the first factor weighed in favor of permitting
the use.2 6
With regard to the second Fair Use factor, the court ruled that as pre-
viously published works, the aesthetic (as opposed to factual) nature of Kelly's
works weighed only slightly against the unauthorized use. As for the third fac-
tor, the court held that the nature of Aribba's use made it necessary that the en-
tire work be copied, and consequently this factor weighed neither for nor against
27the use. Finally, with respect to the fourth factor, the court found that Arriba's
use did not negatively impact Kelly's market for his works, as the thumbnail
images could not serve as a substitute for the original versions; end users inter-
ested in Kelly's photographs were unlikely to acquire the thumbnails in lieu of
the full size originals. Consequently the court decided that the Fair Use analysis
28weighed in favor of permitting Arriba's use.
In sum, the court invoked the Fair Use Doctrine to preserve the over-
arching social utility function of the copyright law. Where the unauthorized
digital use of copyrighted works to create a search engine will benefit the copy-
right public interest without diminishing the copyright holder's legitimate com-
pensation expectations, the Fair Use Doctrine compels that the unauthorized use
be allowed.29
criterion, it is more likely to be held non-infringing than if it is not transformative. This analysis
dovetails well with the market-impact approach discussed immediately above, insofar as market
substitution of a transformative work for the copied work is less likely than the substitution of a
nontransformative work: a 'transformative' work is by definition different in some important way
from the copied work, and therefore is probably not a good substitute. Thus, to the extent a use is
transformative, adverse market impact is less likely.").
26 See Campbell v. Acuff-Rose Music, Inc., 510 U.S. 569, 579 (1994). The prerequisites to the
characterization of a use as transformative are somewhat unsettled; some courts follow the line of
reasoning evident in Arriba, which emphasizes that the use sound in a different, non-competing
market as compared with the market for the underlying work; other courts require some creative
change or addition to the work to be a part of the transformation. See, e.g., UMG Recordings. Inc.
v. MP3.com, Inc.. 92 F. Supp. 2d 349, 351 (S.D.N.Y. 2000); Infinity Broad. Corp. v. Kirkwood,
150 F. 3d 104. 108 (2d Cir. 1998). In addition to the question of the kind or extent of actual
transmogrification, courts have begun to focus on the benefit of the use upon the public interest.
See, e.g., Lateef Mtima, So Dark the COAN(TU) of Man, 70 U. PITT. L. REV. 1 (2009) [hereinafter
So Dark the CON\(TU) of Man].
27 Kelly. 336 F.3d at 820 21.
28 Id. at 822.
29 See Fair Use Standard, supra note 9, at 1125 ("Not every type of market impairment op-
poses fair use."); So Dark the COAT(TU) of Alan, supra note 26, at 85 ("Delineating the commer-
cial market for a copyrighted work has long been an arduous task for the courts ... the mere fact
that someone has found a way to profit from the use of a copyrighted work does not automatically
render that use one within the commercial or 'copyright market' for the work."): Frank Pasquale.
Breaking the Vicious Circularity: Sony's Contribution to the Fair Use Doctrine, 55 CASE WES.
RES. L. REV. 777. 783 84 (2005) ("Like the fair use doctrine generally. 'effect on the market'
analysis is in flux. There are a few fixed guideposts: clearly commercial uses are suspect. and
'transformative' or 'productive' uses are treated more favorably than mere copying. Courts must
keep in mind not only the case at hand, but also its potential ramifications: a use is not fair if 'it
would adversely affect the potential market for the copyrighted work' should it 'become wide-
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Of course, Arriba is not to be construed as a blanket public privilege to
engage in unauthorized search engine or other digital use of copyrighted materi-
al, even in the cause of social utility. 30 Even where the public interest is impli-
cated, such a comprehensive re-allocation of the authors' enumerated exclusive
rights is a question of legislative social engineering relegated to the province of
Congress.31 Consequently, just as the courts have relied upon Fair Use to main-
tain the social utility balance of the copyright law, Congress has resorted to a
variety of legislative mechanisms to incorporate various new technological uses
into the copyright social utility regime.
D. Congress and Copyright Social Utility: The Copyright Compulsory Li-
cense
Given Congress' authority to grant authors property rights in their
works by enumerating certain uses of their works as exclusive to authors, Con-
gress has considerable latitude in determining the nature and extent of the prop-
32erty interests granted to authors in connection with those uses. For example,
in the exercise of its discretion, Congress can exempt specific categories of pub-
lic engagement in an exclusive right from author dominion.33  On a broader
scale, Congress can choose to maintain the authors' exclusive rights to specific
uses of their works, but at the same time mandate terms upon which those uses
must nonetheless be licensed to the public. When Congress elects this alterna-
tive, it fashions a "copyright compulsory license," to both reaffirm author incen-
tives and also guarantee widespread public engagement in a particular use of
copyrighted material.
In adopting a copyright compulsory license, Congress makes the deter-
mination that insofar as the pertinent use for copyrighted material is concerned,
spread."' (footnote omitted)); see generally Wendy J. Gordon. Fair Use as Market Failure: A
Structural and Economic Analysis of the Betamax Case and its Predecessors, 82 COLUM. L. REV.
1600 (1982).
30 First, the Fair Use Doctrine is inherently case specific. Moreover, the Ninth Circuit has
recently had occasion to revisit the issue of Internet search engines and the unauthorized use of
copyrighted material. In Perfect 10, Inc. v. Amazon.Com. Inc.. 508 F.3d 1146 (9th Cir. 2007). the
plaintiff maintained an Internet site, which provided images of nude women to paying subscribers.
Id. One of plaintiffs principal copyright problems was that by using co-defendant Google's
search indices, various third parties would obtain unauthorized copies of plaintiffs images and
post them on their own websites, and otherwise use the images without permission. Id. These
activities not only undercut plaintiff's ability to charge subscription fees for access to its web site,
but some infringers also earned advertising revenue through their illegal websites. Id. Among
other things. Perfect raised the claim that it had an independent market for thumbnail versions of
its images in the cell phone wall paper market. These claims were not at issue in Arriba.
31 Tasini and its Progeny, supra note 3, at 413-14.
32 See Eldred v. Ashcroft, 537 U.S. 186 (2003).
33 See, e.g.. 17 U.S.C. § 108 (1976) (religious use exemptions) and 17 U.S.C. § 110(3) (1997)
(public library use exemptions); see also Ralph Oman. The Teach Act, Five Years Later: What
Have We Learned? Landslide, Vol. No. 1, p. 26. (Sept./Oct. 2008).
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the traditional "author-versus-public" allocation is inadequate to effectuate the
overarching copyright social utility goals. 34 In these situations, Congress is typ-
ically responding to the introduction of a new technological use for copyrighted
material. As discussed above, new technological uses often present socially
complex opportunities for promoting literary and artistic advance.35 A new
technology may replicate an existing exclusive right, but it might also present
new social utility considerations such that automatic relegation of the new tech-
nological use to authors would be inconsistent with the underlying purpose of
copyright protection. To preserve the copyright social utility balance, Congress
instead engages in something of a sui generis apportionment of the use between
authors and the public. Accordingly, the author retains the right to receive com-
pensation in connection with the use, but Congress sets the amount of that com-
pensation, thereby effectively placing control over the right to engage in the use
in the hands of the public.
Congress adopted the first copyright compulsory license in 1909, in
connection with the then new technology of mechanical piano rolls.36 Prior to
the introduction of this technology, it was necessary to attend a live performance
in order to experience the performance of a musical work or composition. Me-
chanical piano rolls made mass exposure to music performance possible; local
establishments could house mechanical piano players, in which proprietors
could insert and play an assortment of manufactured piano rolls, much the same
as an assortment of CDs can be played on today's jukeboxes.37
When mechanical piano rolls were introduced to the public, the owners
of the copyrights in musical works encoded upon the rolls brought suit to enjoin
3 See, e.g.. A Review of the Copyright Licensing Regimes Covering Retransmission of Broad-
cast Signals (Aug. 1, 1997). available at http://www.copyright.gov/reports/ ("A compulsory li-
cense is a statutory copyright licensing scheme whereby copyright owners are required to license
their works to users at a government-fixed price and under government-set terms and condi-
tions .... Compulsory licenses are an exception to the copyright principle of exclusive ownership
for authors of creative works, and, historically, the Copyright Office has only supported the crea-
tion of compulsory licenses when warranted by special circumstances.").
35 Pollack, supra note 15, at 2445 ("Since the advent of the Gutenberg printing press, copy-
right law and technology have been entangled in an ongoing legal chase. In order to advance the
quintessential goal of American copyright law . . . Congress constantly must balance the law's
objectives: to promote widespread dissemination of original creative works, while providing in-
centives to authors and owners to create such works. New technological advances continuously
upset this balance by facilitating the ability to copy works without permission from copyright
holders.").
36 17 U.S.C. § 1(e) (1909); see Stephanie Berg. Remedying the Statutory Damages Remedy for
Secondary Copyright Infringement Liability: Balancing Copyright and Innovation in the Digital
Age. 56 J. COPYRIGHT Soc'Y U.S.A. 265, 332 (2009); Alan Fisch. Compulsory Licensing of
Blacked-Out Professional Team Sporting Event Telecasts (PTSETS): Using Copyright Law to
Mitigate Monopolistic Behavior, 32 HARV. J. ON LEGIS. 403, 417-18 (1995).
37 See Jennifer Mariano Porter, Compulsory Licensing and Cell Phone Ringtones: The Phone
is Ringing, A Court Needs to Answer, 80 TEND. L. REv. 907, 944 (2007).
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and recover for this unauthorized use of their works.38 When the case reached
the United States Supreme Court, however, the Court held that mechanical pi-
ano rolls did not constitute copies within the meaning of the copyright law, and
therefore did not infringe upon the authors' exclusive rights.39
Subsequent to the White-Smith decision, members of the music industry
lobbied Congress to have mechanical piano use expressly categorized as an au-
thor exclusive right. Similar to the circumstances of the present day, however,
the copyrights in many of the nation's popular musical works were held by a
small oligopoly of companies.40 Consequently, allocating mechanical piano roll
use exclusively to authors (who typically assigned their copyrights to corporate
production and distribution entities) would mean that a small group of private
corporations would effectively control the public access to pre-recorded perfor-
mance of the nation's store of musical works.
Congress ultimately concluded that the cultural boon presented by the
introduction of mechanical piano technology was simply too important to leave
to the commercial machinations of the corporate world. Instead, Congress de-
cided to strike a socially pragmatic compromise and adopted the nation's first
copyright compulsory license.41 In fashioning this mechanism, Congress essen-
tially categorized mechanical piano use as the embodiment of an exclusive right;
however, by setting the amount of the fee that could be charged for permission
to engage in this use, Congress allocated control over mechanical piano use to
the general public.42
38 White-Smith Publishing Co. v. Apollo Co, 209 U.S. 1, 9 (1908). The copyright holders
argued that mechanical roll production, distribution, and use infringed upon their exclusive rights
of printing, reprinting, publishing, completing, copying, executing, finishing and vending.
I d. at 17 18. The Court determined that a copy had to be something readable with the hu-
man eye. In adopting the 1976 Act. Congress rejected this characterization, defining a copy to
include any form of fixation of the work, including embodiments that can only be perceived with
the aid of device. See 17 U.S.C. 102(a) (1976); NIMMER & NIMMER, supra note 2, at § 2.03 [B][1 ].
40 See Patrick Fogarty, Major Record Labels and the RIAA: Dinosaurs in a Digital Age?. 9
Hous. Bus. & TAx L. J. 140, 141 (2008); Neil Weinstock Netanel, Impose a Commercial Use Levy
to Allow Free Peer-to-Peer File Sharing, 17 HARV. J.L. & TECH. 1, 26 (2004); Untangling the
Web, supra note 8, at 686; Ankur Srivastava, The Anti-Competitive Music Industry and the Case
for Compulsory Licensing in the Digital Distribution of Music, 22 TOURO L. REv. 375, 385-87
(2006).
41 NIMMER &NIMMER, supra note 2, at § 8.23[A][1].
42 See generally Srivastava. supra note 40. at 467 68 ("A compulsory license at a fair rate
could both provide fair compensation to the copyright holder and permit consumers to benefit
from the advantages of new technology. For these reasons, a scheme of compulsory licensing in
the market for online music distribution would serve the public interest by promoting a new tech-
nology that benefits consumers while respecting the rights of artists and promoting creative activi-
ty."). See also Joseph E. Magri, New Media New Rules: The Digital Performance Right and
Streaming Music Over the Internet, 6 VAND. J. ENT. L. & PRAC. 55, 58 (2003) ("The primary
benefits of obtaining a compulsory license are that copyright owners of Sound Recordings cannot
stop Webcasters from streaming their copyrighted works, and Webcasters know in advance how
much it will cost them to stream copyrighted Sound Recordings over the Internet.").
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Similar to individual copyright litigations wherein courts allow unau-
thorized engagement in an exclusive right under the Fair Use doctrine, in apply-
ing a copyright compulsory license, Congress subordinates author incen-
tive/property interests to the overarching copyright social utility that can be
achieved in facilitating certain unauthorized uses of copyrighted material.
43
Moreover, a copyright compulsory license engenders widespread engagement in
a particular use of copyrighted material, and especially where new technological
uses are concerned, it provides certainty as to the availability and cost of en-
gagement in the use, and thereby promotes exploration of yet additional copy-
right beneficial applications for the new technology.
E. Copyright Social Utility Legislation: the Digital Millennium Copyright
Act
Although Congress has not yet had occasion to adopt a copyright com-
pulsory license in connection with digital use of copyrighted works, it has
passed various laws that edify the copyright social utility function in the digital
information context. Chief among these laws is the Digital Millennium Copy-
right Act 4  Although regarded by some as "copyright industry protectionist
legislation,, 4 5 certain of the Act's provisions arguably serve important social
utility goals.
43 After adopting the first compulsory copyright license, Congress would confront the problem
of new technological use allocation on various occasions throughout the twentieth century. See
Tasini and Its Progeny, supra note 3. at 406 08 ("In the early efforts to commercially exploit
cable television technology, cable network entrepreneurs often erected broadcast receiving anten-
nae in or near remote regions. where residents were unable to receive network television broad-
casts using only conventional television sets. These antennae were erected for the purpose of
capturing network broadcasts being transmitted through the air, which were then re-transmitted
via cable to area residents for a fee. In response to this unauthorized use of their copyrighted
broadcasts, the holders of the copyrights in televised programs instigated copyright infringement
litigation against the cable entrepreneurs. The network copyright holders argued that cable re-
transmission constituted an unauthorized engagement in one of their exclusive rights, specifically
the exclusive right to perform their works publicly .... The Supreme Court ultimately ruled that
cable re-transmission is closer in character to uses relegated to the public than it is to the exclusive
right of public performance [relegated to copyright holders]." Once again (in response to lobbying
efforts) "Congress would [effectively] overrule the Supreme Court [by expressly] designat[ing]
cable re-transmission as an exclusive right, [but by doing] so in a manner that lent credence to the
Supreme Court's reluctance to approach cable re-transmission as no more than a simulation or
combination of certain pre-existing exclusive rights .... Congress imposed a compulsory license
in connection with its [de facto] designation of cable re-transmission as an exclusive right. This
meant that although Congress granted copyright holders the right to profit from the new use of
cable re-transmission, it did not grant them the right to control it.").
44 Digital Millennium Copyright Act of 1998, Pub. L. No. 105-304, 112 Stat. 2860 (1998)
(scattered throughout Title 17 of the United States Code); see generally Peter S. Menell, Can Our
Current Conception of Copyright Law Survive in the Internet Age? 46 N. Y. L. Sch. L. Rev. 63,
133 38 (2002 2003).
45 Jeffrey Cobia, The Digital Millennium Copyright Act Takedown Notice Procedure: Misuses,
Abuses, and Shortcomings of the Process, 10 MINN. J.L. Sci. & TECH. 387 (2009) (describing how
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For example, the traditional doctrines of copyright contributory and vi-
carious liability, through which a defendant can be held responsible for copy-
right infringement committed by a third party, have proven ill-suited for appli-
cation to Internet activities, given the ease of surreptitious digital duplication
and distribution of copyrighted material and the inability of Internet Service
Providers ("ISPs") to monitor the activities of their customers.46 Under these
principles, ISPs would be required to defend against innumerable copyright in-
fringement lawsuits arising from their customers' use of copyrighted material on
the Internet. Considering the potential impact on the growth and availability of
Internet access service, Congress incorporated certain "safe harbor" provisions
into the DMCA, which effectively immunize ISPs from indirect liability claims
stemming from infringement misconduct on the part of their customers.47 The
DMCA safe harbor provisions facilitate the legitimate Internet use and dissemi-
nation of copyrighted works and the provision of Internet access service as a
whole.
The DMCA also includes provisions that advance the socially produc-
tive use of computer software programs, which are protected as literary works
under the Copyright Act.48 Whenever a computer is turned on, copies of any
computer programs resident on the machine are automatically loaded on to the
computer's random access memory ("RAM"). Prior to the passage of the
DMCA, some owners of copyrighted software programs argued that automatic
RAM copies of their programs could not be created without their permission, as
such unauthorized "copying" would technically violate their exclusive rights of
reproduction. This argument was typically advanced by software copyright
owners who were also in the computer maintenance business, and deployed to
prevent their competitors from providing maintenance services to customers
whose computers housed copyrighted programs.49  Obviously all functioning
the DMCA takedown procedure fails to adequately enforce copyrights, leads to violations of
copyrights, and is used inappropriately to censor criticism); Brette G. Meyers, Filtering Systems
or Fair Use? A Comparative Analysis of Proposed Regulations for User-Generated Content, 26
CARDOZO ARTS & ENT. L.J. 935 (2009) (discussing the short-comings of the DMCA application
towards online service providers); Alfred Yen. Internet Service Provider Liability for Subscriber
Copyright Infringement, Enterprise Liability, and the First Amendment. 88 GEO. L.J. 1833. 1834,
1837 38, 1885 90 (2000) (explaining the numerous problems with the DCMA including the
ambiguities in the law).
46 See, e.g., Religious Technology Ctr. v. Netcom On-Line Comm., 907 F. Supp. 1361 (N.D.
Cal. 1995).
47 See 17 § U.S.C. § 512(a)-(d) (2003); Joseph W. Cormier, Richard Kozell & Jessica L.
McCurdy, Intellectual Property Crimes, 46 AM. CRIM. L. REV. 761, 803 (2009): Joshua A.T.
Fairfield, The God Paradox, 89 B.U. L. REV. 1017, 1031 33 (2009); Lateef Mtima. Whom The
Gods Would Destroy: Why Congress Prioritized Copyright Protection Over Internet Privacy in
Passing the Digital Millennium Copyright Act, 61 RUTGERS L. REV. 627, 649 51 (2009).
48 17 U.S.C. § 117(a)-(d) (1998); 17 U.S.C. § 1201 () (1999).
49 As the strategy went, as long as a copyrighted program was present on a computer, the
computer could not be turned on absent the copyright holder's permission to create automatic
RAM copies of the program. Whereas such permission was implicitly granted to the owner of the
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computers contain software programs, and thus third-party computer mainten-
ance providers could not offer their services without risking copyright infringe-
ment litigation by the owners of any copyrighted programs resident on a pros-
pective customer's computer.
In response to lobbying efforts by various computer software constitu-
ents, Congress ultimately concluded that MAI Systems Corp. v. Peak Computer,
Inc. and similar "non-volitional RAM infringement" decisions had applied the
copyright law to the unique characteristics of digital information technology in a
manner that undermined legitimate competition in the computer software main-
tenance business. Moreover, this interpretation of the copyright law adversely
affected the development, use, and improvement of copyrightable software pro-
grams (all of which require that a computer be turned on) in contravention of the
fundamental objectives underlying the extension of copyright protection to
computer software programs.5° Accordingly, Congress included provisions in
the DMCA which permit the unauthorized, automatic generation of RAM copies
of copyrighted software programs which occurs when a computer is turned on in
order to undergo maintenance service.5'
From issue-specific legislation such as the DMCA, to new technological
use copyright compulsory licenses, Congress has historically employed a variety
of legislative initiatives to implement the social utility function of the copyright
law. As discussed above, the courts have achieved similar results through use of
the Fair Use Doctrine. However, while such efforts constitute affirmative acts
of copyright social engineering, the advent of digital information technology has
spurred many IP social activists to ask whether Congress and the courts have a
further obligation to undertake an even broader social agenda of achieving copy-
right social justice in the implementation of the copyright law. Succinctly put,
if current technological developments make it possible to extend the benefits of
full copyright access and participation to every segment of society, does the
Copyright Clause permit, indeed does it require affirmative legislative and judi-
cial action to redress pertinent social inequities and other problems of copyright
social injustice?
computer who would presumably hold a license to use (and therefore make RAM copies of) the
software program, such implicit permission did not extend to third parties (especially competitors
of the copyright holder). See, e.g.. MAI Systems Corp. v. Peak Computer. Inc., 991 F.2d 511, 518
(9th Cir. 1993) (wherein the Ninth Circuit held that unauthorized automatic RAM copying pro-
vides a basis for a copyright infringement claim).
50 See generally Kenneth M. Alfano, Copyright In Exile: Restoring The Original Parameters
of Exclusive Reproduction, 11 J. TECH. L. & POL'Y 215, 247 50, 252 (2006): Thomas F. Cotter,
The Procompetitive Interest in Intellectual Property Law. 48 WM. & MARY L. REv. 483, 546
n.254 (2006): So Dark the CON(TU) of Man. supra note 26. at 22 23; Lateef Mtima, Protecting
and Licensing Software: Copyright and Common Law Contract Considerations, SM049 ALI-
ABA 81, 90 (2006).
51 17 U.S.C. § 117(a), (c), (d) (1998). Because of the language used in the statute, it is unclear
whether the provision is limited solely to RAM copies created in connection with the provision of
maintenance service, or extends to all instances of non-volitional RAM copying.
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As discussed in the next section, the Constitutional Copyright Clause
can indeed be reasonably interpreted to require a measure of copyright social
justice in the fulfillment of its social utility mandate. Moreover, Digital Entre-
preneurship stratagems and similarly socially responsive copyright strategies
can be especially beneficial in shaping policies and initiatives for attaining this
goal in the digital information age.
PART ii. ACHIEVING INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY EMPOWERMENT AND SOCIAL
JUSTICE THROUGH THE COPYRIGHT LAW: CONSTITUTIONAL MANDATES FOR
COPYRIGHT SOCIAL JUSTICE
A. Uncovering Social Justice Imperatives in the Copyright Social Utility
Mandate
Although Article I, Section 8 explicitly mandates that the copyright law
serve to "promote the progress of the arts" and thus act as a mechanism for the
social engineering and advancement of American culture, the Constitution does
not specify all that compliance with this edict must entail. The Constitutional
Framers wisely penned a broad directive of social utility, one amenable to legis-
lative and judicial interpretation and application, as well as adaptation to the
changing realities and mores of an evolving national culture. The fact that the
Constitution requires that the copyright law perform a function of social utility,
however, does not automatically mean that it also work as an engine for social
justice.52 While the constitutional mandate assures the broad dissemination and
52 While the terms "social utility" and "social justice" defy concrete definition, they might at
least be distinguished by characterizing mechanisms of social utility as bringing about useful.
pragmatic social benefits to society, such as an increase in creative output. and characterizing
mechanisms for social justice as effectuating pervasive fairness and equity. See, e.g.. Anupam
Chander & Madhavi Sunder, Is Nozick Kicking Rawls's Ass? Intellectual Property and Social
Justice, 40 U.C. DAviS L. REv. 563, 564 (2007) ("Social justice, after all, is generally taken to
require significant obligations towards the poor."). While these categorizations of social utility
and social justice often overlap, they can also diverge; specific legal rules and social policies
might benefit the greater good, however, ignoring any resulting disproportionate negative impact
upon discreet minorities or disenfranchised segments of society raises questions of social justice:
Mary W. S. Wong, Toward An Alternative Normative Framework for Copyright: From Private
Property to Human Rights. 26 CARDOZO ARTS & ENT. L.J. 775. 830 (2009) ("Many ... scholars
share the belief that the current international IP regime does not adequately accommodate con-
cerns of distributive social justice, and the relatively simplistic utilitarian balancing act it currently
espouses tends to favor IP producers (who are located primarily in developed, mostly Western,
countries). It does not easily allow for non-economic developmental considerations that are em-
phasized by human rights jurisprudence and norms, and that are socially beneficial objectives that
IP regimes ought to incorporate. Alongside specific proposals for addressing these inadequacies,
[these] scholars ... support (either explicitly or implicitly) a broader approach that incorporates
social and cultural theory, and that more clearly maps to less utilitarian objectives such as self-
actualization, freedom of choice, and human development.").. See, e.g.. Carla D. Pratt: Way To
Represent: The Role of Black Lawyers in Contemporary American Democracy, 77 FORDHAM L.
REV. 1409, 1410 n.1 (2009) ("[In] a participatory model of democracy ... all citizens have equal
opportunity for full and active participation in not only government institutions, but also in non-
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use of copyrighted works, it is unclear whether it also guarantees that everyone
will actually enjoy equal access to the fruits and benefits of the copyright re-
gime.53 Whether the Constitutional grant of power in the Intellectual Property
Clause contains within it a requirement that the copyright law also achieve so-
cial equity and fairness within the copyright infrastructure is a separate question.
Some legal scholars and commentators have questioned whether the
copyright law can truly be said to fulfill its function of social utility if in advanc-
ing the societal culture, it fails to also achieve an adequate measure of social
justice. 54  Does a civilization genuinely advance when significant segments of
its populace remain bereft of the benefits of societal progress and achievements?
Indeed, the advent of digital information technology, and the concomitant
governmental institutions such as corporations, schools, and unions. Under this broad view of
democracy, equality means not just political equality for citizens, but social equality as well ....
While our democratic project has enacted laws aimed at extending legal citizenship as rights, it
has not been as effective at extending citizenship ... as public participation to racial minorities,
particularly blacks."); Jennifer B. Wriggins, Torts, Race, and the Value of Injury, 1900 1949. 49
How. L. J. 99, 99 100 (2005).
53 Constitutional Equal Protection of course does not require equal access to all of the benefits
of a modern society. See, e.g., Sharona Hoffman, Preparing for Disaster: Protecting the Most
Vulnerable in Emergencies. 42 U.C. DAVIS L. REV. 1491, 1516-19 (2009): see generally Christo-
pher R. Green, The Original Sense of the (Equal) Protection Clause: Subsequent Interpretation
and Application, 19 GEO. MASON U. Civ. RTS. L.J. 219 (2009). In theory, the state makes copy-
right protection equally available to all citizens, and at least as a matter of the law, everyone has
the same opportunity to enjoy the works produced as a result. K.J. Greene, Copyright, Culture &
Black Music: A Legacy of Unequal Protection. 21 HASTINGS CoMM.& ENT. L.J. 339, 340-41
(1999) [hereinafter A Legacy of Unequal Protection]. The Intellectual Property Clause does not
guarantee, however, that everyone will actually be able to afford the price of copies these works,
any more than it guarantees that everyone will have the same opportunity to be educated by these
works or the freedom to express any creative ideas that such works might stimulate. Some of
these rights may be guaranteed by other provisions of the Constitution. but arguments that they are
compelled by the Intellectual Property clause can be difficult to articulate. See, e.g., Julie E. Co-
hen, Copyright and the Perfect Curve, 53 VAND. L. REV. 1799, 1801-08 (2000); John P. Conley
& Christopher S. Yoo. Nonrivalry and Price Discrimination in Copyright Economics. 157 U. PA.
L. REV. 1801, 1802-28 (2009); Douglas L. Rogers, Increasing Access to Knowledge Through
Fair Use Analyzing The Google Litigation to Unleash Developing Countries. 10 TuL. J. TECH.
& INTELL. PROP. 110-14 (2007); Sara K. Stadler, Copyright as Trade Regulation, 155 U. PA. L.
REV. 899, 913-16 (2007).
54 See Keith Aoki, Distributive and Syncretic Motives in Intellectual Property Law (With Spe-
cial Reference to Coercion, Agency and Development). 40 U.C. DAVIS L. REV. 717 (2007); Jamar,
supra note 5; Chander & Sunder, supra note 52; Margaret Chon. Intellectual Property and the
Development Divide, 27 CARDOZO L. REV. 2821 (2006); Julie E. Cohen, Creativity and Culture in
Copyright Theory, 40 U.C. DAvis L. REv. 1151 (2007); K.J. Greene, "Copynorms, " Black Cul-
tural Production, and the Debate Over African-American Reparations, 25 CARDOZO ARTS & ENT.
L.J. 1179 (2008) [hereinafter Copynorms]; McDonald, supra note 8; Lateef Mtima, Symposium:
Intellectual Property and Social Justice, 48 How. L.J. 571 (2005) [hereinafter Intellectual Proper-
ty and Social Justice]; Ruth Okediji. Givers, Takers, and Other Kinds of Users: A Fair Use Doc-
trine For Cyberspace, 53 FLA. L. REV. 107 (2001): Hannibal Travis, Building Universal Digital
Libraries: An Agendafor Copyright Reform. 33 PEPP. L. REV. 761 (2006).
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growth in diurnal importance of copyrighted works and other forms of intellec-
tual property have rendered the question more real than theoretical. 55 The proli-
feration of digital technology has made comprehensive access to the store of
copyrighted works a routine aspect of modern life for some,56 and if these re-
sources are also placed within the reach of the poor and technologically margi-
nalized, universal copyright access could become an immediate reality.
57
Viewed from this perspective, regardless of the independent social justice
breadth of the Intellectual Property Clause, the Constitution as a whole, adopted
and ordained to form a more perfect union and to "secure Justice" and "promote
the General Welfare," arguably requires affirmative action in the cause of copy-
right social justice.
58
55 See Chander & Sunder, supra note 52. at 565 ("The Internet through its various applica-
tions, from the World Wide Web and e-mail to peer-to-peer file sharing enables anyone to
share the stuff of intellectual property, the intellectual products themselves, relatively cheaply and
widely. This radical change in the technology for disseminating intellectual products fosters hope
for the most widespread use of human knowledge. Borges's infinite library becomes almost con-
ceivable, though it is not clear whether its midwife will be Google or a coalition of libraries.").
56 June M. Besek, Anti-Circumvention Laws and Copyright: A Report From the Kernochan
Centerfor Law, Media and the Arts, 27 COLUM. J.L. & ARTS 385, 391 (2004); Garon, supra note
18, at 1335-36 ("Scholars have described the Internet as 'a unique and wholly new medium of
worldwide human communication.' The Internet can facilitate an ever expanding range of infor-
mation flow and entertainment activities that include passive listening and viewing of music, film,
and audiovisual works, interactive gaming. instant messaging, file sharing, collaborative author-
ing, and a host of other activities .... Digital storage and transmission also allow for virtually
perfect reproduction of [material converted into digital formats], with the ability to copy and
transmit each file having essentially no reproduction cost .... The format of the digital file results
in a conflation of ideas, information, and the copyrighted expression, as the 'computer file' be-
comes the unitary metaphor for all three attributes of the work."); Peter S. Menell, Envisioning
Copyright Law's Digital Future, 46 N.Y.L. SCH. L. REV. 63, 66 (2002); Neil Weinstock Netanel,
Impose a Commercial Use Levy to Allow Free Peer-to-Peer File Sharing, 17 HARV. J.L. & TECH.
1, 3 (2004) ("P2P file sharing is not just downloading music and movies for free. It is a vehicle
for finding works that are otherwise not available, discovering new genres, making personalized
compilations. and posting creative remixes. sequels. and modifications of popular works. By
engaging in such activities, people who might previously have been passive consumers now assert
a more active, self-defining role in the enjoyment, use, and creation of cultural expression."); Dan
Thu Thi Phan, Will Fair Use Function on the Internet?, 98 COLUM. L. REV. 169, 191-93 (1998).
57 See; Tasini and Its Progeny. supra note 3. at 436-42; Oman, supra note 33: Emily Anne
Proskine, Google's Technicolor Dreamcoat: A Copyright Analysis of the Google Book Search
Library Project, 21 BERKELEY TECH. L.J. 213, 239 (2006); Douglas L. Rogers, Increasing Access
to Knowledge Through Fair Use: Analyzing the Google Litigation to Unleash Developing Coun-
tries, 10 TUL. J. TECH. & INTELL. PROP. 1, 47-51 (2007); Travis, supra note 54, at 763-64; David
Cook, Case Note, Searching for Answers in a Digital World: How Field v. Google Could Affect
Fair Use Analysis in the Internet Age. 11 SMU Sci. & TECH. L. REV. 77, 83 84 (2007).
58 Chander & Sunder, supra note 52, at 578 ("No human domain should be immune from the
claims of social justice. Intellectual property, like property law, structures social relations and has
profound social effects."); Charles H. Norchi, The Legal Architecture of Aation-Building: An
Introduction, 60 ME. L. REV. 281. 290 (2008) ("Ensuring the human dignity of the beneficiary
population is one of the foundational justifications for nation-building projects. As a practical
matter, this is also a precondition for progress on any other reconstruction front.").
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While resort to the ecumenical provisions of the Constitution is certain-
ly a viable means through which to construct an affirmative mandate for copy-
right social justice, it may not be necessary to search beyond the Intellectual
Property Clause to identify an analytical foundation upon which the beachhead
for copyright social justice can be established. It is also possible, perhaps even
preferable to assess the objectives of copyright social utility and salient issues of
copyright social injustice for interdependent themes and resolutions. The copy-
right law exists to further an enunciated social purpose, and much the same as
when technological developments disrupt the copyright status quo and threaten
to frustrate that purpose, where problems of copyright social injustice and ineq-
uity similarly impede copyright utility, affirmative legislative and judicial action
is warranted. Consequently, evaluating problems of copyright social injustice
for their impact on copyright social utility can reveal a theory of copyright so-
cial justice firmly rooted in the Intellectual Property Clause itself.
B. Copyright Social Utility/Social Justice Interdependence
Identifying interdependent issues of copyright social utility and social
justice is not as difficult as it might initially seem. In many instances, it merely
requires an appreciation for the ultimate social utility ramifications of copyright
social injustice, and/or an intellectual sensitivity toward the copyright social
justice benefits that naturally flow from mechanisms of copyright social utility.
59
For example, the tragic history of African American and other margina-
lized members of society being systematically defrauded out of the commercial
profits derived from their creative genius, is widely lamented as a quintessential
60example of social injustice within the intellectual property regime. Often una-
59 See, e.g., Danielle Conway-Jones, Safeguarding Hawaiian Traditional Knowledge and
Cultural Heritage. Supporting the Right to Self-Determination and Preventing the Co-
modification of Culture, 48 How. L.J. 737 (2005); Copynorms, supra note 54: Jamar. supra note
5; McDonald, supra note 1; Intellectual Property and Social Justice. supra note 54; Simone A.
Rose, On Purple Pills, Stem Cells, and Other Market Failures: A Case for a Limited Compulsory
Licensing Scheme for Patent Property, 48 HOw. L.J. 579 (2005).
60 See Aoki. supra note 54. at 740-41 ("[T]he American patent system encouraged a more
diverse composition of inventors through broadened access to opportunities for investing in. ex-
ploiting, and deriving income from inventive activity. However, because of the historical realities
of race and slavery, the extent of this beneficial distributive impact on black inventors was illusory
at best .... The early American patent system beckoned many poor white inventors to achieve
wealth and recognition through a quasi-egalitarian patent system that facilitated investment in
their lucrative ideas. The same opportunities did not await black inventors, whose contributions
white society tended to ignore when the commercial value of a black invention was uncertain. In
cases where commercial promise was more readily apparent. black inventions were subject to
appropriation without attribution. State laws governing property and contract expressly precluded
slaves from applying for or holding property. Presumably. this proscription included slaves being
precluded from owning patents."); Copynorms, supra note 54, at 1180-81 ("The institutional
music industry has resorted to copyright infringement lawsuits to stem massive Internet piracy in
recent years .... [T]he 'copynorms' rhetoric the entertainment industry espouses shows particular
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ware of the opportunities and protections afforded by the intellectual property
law, and sometimes simply lacking the legal or economic resources to secure
and enforce their rights, these artists and innovators saw their rightful rewards
misappropriated by white artists, publishers, entrepreneurs, and promoters, and
sometimes even academics and scholars, all of whom had access to the financial
and racial capital essential to commercial development and exploitation of artis-
tic and innovative works.6'
In the commercial entertainment industry alone, it is probably impossi-
ble to tally, much less make reparation in connection with the billions of dollars
that African American and other marginalized artists and entertainers have been
robbed of through the unauthorized and inequitable exploitation of their aesthet-
ic genius, and the concomitant manipulation of the copyright law.62 From the
annals of Jazz to tap to Rock and Roll, many of the actual originators of some of
America's most significant art forms languished in poverty and perished in ob-
scurity, while their white imitators enjoyed fame, riches, and unearned places in
history.63
irony in light of its long history of piracy of the works of African-American artists, such as blues
artists and composers. For many generations, black artists as a class were denied the fruits of
intellectual property protection - credit, copyright royalties and fair compensation. Institutional
discrimination teamed with intellectual property and contract law resulted in the widespread un-
der-protection of black artistic creativity. Similarly, black inventors created technical and scientif-
ic works that impacted early American industries. Evidence exists that black inventors also faced
similar divestiture in the industrial marketplace. The mass appropriation of the work of black
artists and inventors reflects the systemic subordination based on race that characterized most of
U.S. history."); A Legacy of Unequal Protection, supra note 53, at 357-58.
61 For an excellent synopsis, see Neela Kartha. Digital Sampling and Copyright Law in the
Social Context: No More Colorblindness!. 14 U. MIAMI ENT. & SPORTS L. REv. 218, 219 23
(1997); see also JOHN COLLIS, THE STORY OF CHESS RECORDS 117 (1998): JAMES LINCOLN
COLLIER, THE MAKING OF JAzz: A COMPREHENSIVE HISTORY 106 (1978): Evans C. Anyanwu,
Let's Keep it on the Download. Why the Educational Use Factor of the Fair Use Exception
Should Shield Rap Music from Infringement Claims, 30 RUTGERS COMPUTER & TECH. L.J. 179,
181-82 (2004); Olufunmilayo B. Arewa, Copyright on Catfish Row: Musical Borrowing, Porgy
and Bess and Unfair Use, 37 RUTGERS L.J. 277, 350-51 (2006); Leslie Espinoza & Angela P.
Harris, Afterword: Embracing the Tar-Baby-LatCrit Theory and the Sticky Hess of Race, 10 LA
RAZA L.J. 499. 512 13 (1998); Henry Self. Digital Sampling: A Cultural Perspective, 9 UCLA
ENT. L. REV. 347, 352 53 (2002).
62 Copynorms, supra note 54, at 1183-84 ("Black artists did not share rewards commiserate
with their enormous creativity. From an economic perspective, black artists sustained losses
through deprivation of copyright protection that would constitute a massive sum."); K.J. Greene,
Intellectual Property at the Intersection of Race and Gender: Lady Sings the Blues, 16 AM. U. J.
GENDER SOC. POL'Y & L. 365, 381 (2008) [hereinafter Lady Sings the Blues]: Kartha. supra note
61. at 234.
63 NELSON GEORGE, THE DEATH OF RHYTHM 'N' BLUES 108 (1988) ("Blacks Create and then
move on. Whites document and then recycle. In the history of popular music these truths are self-
evident."); Copynorms supra note 54. at 1184 85, 1188 89 ("In the context of cultural produc-
tion, Ellisonian invisibility is concrete in all its bitter irony. In the face of prolific and innovative
Black musical creativity, 'Whites [in the 1920s] often vehemently denied that African Americans
had made any contribution to the creation ofjazz. New Orleans "Dixieland" musicians ... made
it a point of honor never to mix with Black musicians or acknowledge their talents.' In later years,
27
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While this ignoble travesty implicates the copyright law, it also bes-
peaks of pervasive pathologies of American legal and social injustice. After all,
the poor and disenfranchised are often socially and economically victimized and
exploited, and otherwise deprived of equal protection under the law. Arguably,
correcting such injustice where the subject res consists of copyrights is no more
within the substantive province of the copyright law than preventing land fraud
swindles is within the substantive province of the real property law. While the
problem of "copyright bait and switch" certainly warrants legal redress, an im-
portant threshold question is whether such redress can be analytically rooted in
the copyright law.
Although it typically proves counterproductive to contort laws intended
to regulate specific areas of endeavor to redress generally undesirable beha-
vior,64 there are some such situations in which adjustment to the pertinent laws
65of narrow scope is appropriate. Where structural gaps in the law facilitate
particular socially undesirable behavior, or where clever charlatans devise me-
thods to undermine the purpose of the law, albeit without technically violating
its express terms, reinterpretation or even modification of the law's provisions
may be necessary to preserve its purpose.6 6 Thus for example, notwithstanding
it was widely conceded that 'though African-Americans had certainly invented ragtime and jazz,
these musical styles were being brought to their highest levels by [White] outsiders."' (quoting
BURTON W. PERETTI, JAZZ IN AMERICAN CULTURE 42 43 (1993)) Kartha. supra note 61, at 232
34 ("The compulsory license made it possible for white artists to shanghai the African-American
songbook. Pat Boone was notorious for covering Little Richard's music, and eventually, songs
"by niggers for niggers" realized a catalog value as great as those of Tin Pan Alley tunesmiths.
Another unfortunate reality was that the Black songwriters and performers did not always under-
stand the value of publishing rights which ended up being owned by white record companies. A
great deal of revenue was generated by white groups covering Black hits .... Eric Clapton is an
excellent example of an artist who reached long term fame using a lot of unoriginal music and
styles taken from Black artists .... When he was with John Mayall's Bluesbreakers he recorded
(blues artist) Freddie King's "Hideaway," Otis Rush and Willie Dixon's "All Your Love," Robert
Johnson's "Ramblin' On My Mind," and later, with the rock group Cream, he recorded "Cros-
sroads," another Robert Johnson song. When he was with Derek and the Dominos he recorded
Willie Dixon's "Evil," Elmore James's "The Sky Is Crying," and later in his solo career he im-
itated reggae music. He recorded some music in Jamaica (not including "I Shot the Sheriff")
where he recorded Peter Tosh's "Whatcha Gonna Do." How would Eric Clapton's career fare a
"total concept and feel" analysis like that set forth in Roth Greeting Cards v. United Card Co.?").
64 See, e.g., Daniel Benoliel, Copyright Distributive Injustice, 10 YALE J.L. & TECH. 45 (2007).
65 Copynorms. supra note 54. at 1217 ("The legal regimes of IP and contract, situated in a
matrix hostile to both Black cultural production and to Black economic autonomy. failed to pro-
tect the interests of Black creative artists on a grand scale .... "); Kartha, supra note 61.
66 See IAN AYRES. PERVASIVE PREJUDICE? 140-44 (2001); Copynorms. supra note 54, at 1194
95 ("Many of the defining features of contract theory. including the notion of freedom of contract,
the objective theory of contract formation, the doctrine of adequacy of consideration and tradi-
tional hostility to undoing bargains absent fraud or duress, facilitated the subordination of Black
artists. An unregulated system of contract disadvantages those with the least access to power and
information in society. The unacknowledged gorilla in the room, racial stratification, rendered
contract protection illusory to a large class of Black creators."); Lateef Mtima, African-American
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the sacrosanct principal of freedom of contract endemic to the American legal
ethos, every state in the Union has adopted a Statute of Frauds provision, which
mandates that agreements to transfer interests in real property be expressed in
writing if they are to be legally enforceable. 67 The stability of legal title to real
property is a socio-legal objective of substantive contract and real property law
that is considered too important to leave vulnerable to the general threats of wit-
ness perjury and imperfect memories. Where generic misdeeds and social
shortcomings uniquely undermine specific socio-legal objectives, the relevant
substantive law can and should be adapted to meet such cognizable threats to the
law's ambition.68
Economic Empowerment Strategies for the New Millennium: Revisiting the Washington-Du Bois
Dialectic, 42 How. L.J. 391, 409 (1999) [hereinafter Empowerment Strategies] ("The problem [of
contemporary racial discrimination] is the efficacy of anti-discrimination laws and policies con-
ceived principally in an era of overt racism, which efficacy is somewhat diluted in an era of co-
vert, sometimes reflexive discrimination. Since today's discriminator never says, and indeed,
probably rarely even thinks the word 'nigger,' legal and social constructs attuned to such behavior
are rendered impotent, unless indicia such as disproportionate impact are afforded appropriate
consideration as colorable evidence sufficient to support (at least) an inference of discriminatory
effect."); Jennifer B. Wriggins, Torts, Race, and the Value of injury, 49 How. L.J. 99, 101 (2005)
("Examining inequality in the law.., requires more than knowing whether clear exclusions oper-
ated to blatantly fence out groups of people .... [D]ecentralized, informal practices engaged in by
individual actors within the legal system, for example, have resulted in a discriminatory structure
and discriminatory outcomes when aggregated.").
67 See ALVIN L. ARNOLD AND JEANNE O'NEILL, I REAL ESTATE LEASING PRACTICE MANUAL §
1:25 (2009); LEONARD OPPENHEIM, SIDNEY PUGH INGRAM, 11 LA. Civ. L. TREATISE, TRUSTS § 101
n.2 (2008 ed.); Robert H. Kelley, Any Reports of the Death of the Property Law Paradigm for
Leases Have Been Greatly Exaggerated, 41 WAYNE L. REV. 1563, 1588 (1995). Indeed, the anal-
ogy between transfers of interests in real property and copyright interests is particularly apt in that
the transfer of certain interests in copyright are also required to be memorialized in a writing to be
enforceable at law: Christopher B. Woods, Commercial Law: Determining Repugnancy in an
Electronic Age: Excluded Transactions Under Electronic Writing and Signature Legislation, 52
OKLA. L. REV. 411,433-34 (1999). See 17 U.S.C. § 204(a) (1978).
68 AYRES, supra note 66, at 140-41 ("The 1960s civil rights legislation outlawed discrimina-
tion in those markets - most notably housing and employment - in which the seller's disparate
treatment was open and notorious. But the absence of a manifest benchmark does not imply the
absence of discrimination; there is no reason to think that animus or statistical causes of discrimi-
nation manifest themselves only in markets in which interracial comparisons of treatment can be
readily made. Indeed, as various overt forms of discrimination have become illegal. more subtle
and covert manifestations have replace them .... The existence of disparate racial treatment
[evidence] is not only important in and of itself ... but also provides an opening wedge to justify
a fundamental expansion of the domain of our civil rights law."); Copynorms, supra note 54, at
1182 ("A pillar of all IP is the provision of 'limited property rights in intangible products of in-
vestments, intellect and/or labor.' Until recently, IP scholarship focused on doctrine and theory
that did not include an examination of social and cultural subordination and inequity. However,
IP scholars are increasingly recognizing that the legal regimes of intellectual property are inextric-
ably linked to systems of social and economic inequality.") Norchi. supra note 58, at 295 96
("Thinking and working below the state means not confusing legal systems with legal rules. In
any community, rules rest on the surface of the legal system. The real dimensions of the system
are often found in other places. This is especially apparent in traditional villages where customary
and formalized councils are both engaged in choice-making, in dividing up the weal and woe of
29
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The social engineering aspirations which underlie American copyright
law were of sufficient importance to the Framers that they provided for their
satisfaction in the very first Article of the Constitution. Included among those
goals is a system for author incentives, intended to help fuel artistic output. 69 It
would seem important that these goals are not frustrated by self-serving repro-
bates who would derail the copyright incentive function in favor of personal
gain.
When the author incentive function is so widely corrupted that authors
from significant segments of the population are systematically deprived of their
copyright property rights and incentives, it is not only a problem of copyright
social injustice, it also constitutes an assault upon the function of copyright so-
cial utility. 70  Creative authors who do not benefit from the copyright regime
life. One must come to terms with other processes within the culture and the society if one is to
truly understand law in context."); Alfreda Robinson. Corporate Social Responsibility and African
American Reparations: Jubilee. 55 RUTGERS L. REV. 309 (2003) ("[T]raditional legal doctrines
are 'stretched to the limit' to meet the incomparable African American experience of racial op-
pression. The law must be "stretched to the limit" . .. in order to address racially motivated, im-
moral, horrific, and inhumane acts against African Americans. The law must be taken out of its
usual framework, in which it protects white privileges. The case for Reparations reconstitutes the
law, causing it to look at the case through the eyes of the victims. To analyze the case under the
conventional profile of corporate wrongdoing is to miss the focus of the inquiry .... The legal
concepts of liability and limitation of actions need to be reformulated to meet the imperative.
[T]raditional formulations of the law must be "stretched to the limit" to surmount a barrier of legal
doctrines that were part and parcel infliction of the injuries to be remedied. Law legitimated and
maintained the slave trade, slavery, forced prisoner leasing, post-Emancipation control over Afri-
can Americans, Jim Crow practices, and racial segregation. It continues to legitimate and main-
tain existing racially disparate distributions of wealth and power. The corporate social responsi-
bility movement attacks and rejects the shareholder primacy norm, a mainstay of traditional cor-
porate law .... The social responsibility proponents argue that we substitute a stakeholder model
in its stead, a model that asks the corporation to attend to the needs of the wider community of its
dependents and victims. The stakeholder model must also be 'stretched to the limit."').
69 See, e.g., Jonathan S. Lawson, Eight Million Performances Later, Still Not a Dime: Why it is
Time to Comprehensively Protect Sound Recording Public Performances, 81 NOTRE DAME L.
REV. 693, 701 (2006) ("Congressional extension of copyright protection to types of works and
rights effectively confers a limited monopoly right upon authors, which often motivates authors to
create more works, thus benefiting society through diversity of choice. The Founding Fathers
envisioned this benefit to society and granted Congress, through Article 1, Section 8. the ability to
provide an author a temporary monopoly over his work, which would increase the total number of
works and thus promote the "Progress of Science and useful Arts."); Scott L. Bach, Note, Music
Recording, Publishing, and Compulsory Licenses: Toward a Consistent Copyright Law, 14
HOFSTRA L. REV. 379, 396-97 (1986) ("The framers of the Constitution concluded that the most
effective way to encourage creative expression is to give exclusive rights to authors for a period of
limited duration. Such rights, however, are not Constitutionally guaranteed. but are created in
Congress's discretion." (footnotes omitted)).
70 See, e.g., United States v. Paramount Pictures, Inc. 334 U.S. 131, 158 (1948) ("[R]eward to
the author or artist serves to induce release to the public of the products of his creative genius.");
Intellectual Property and Social Justice. supra note 54. at 576; Copynorms, supra note 54. at
1183; Mark Schultz & Alec van Gelder, Creative Development: Helping Poor Countries By
Building Creative Industries. 97 KY. L.J. 79 (2008).
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have little incentive to participate in it. When marginalized groups and com-
munities have no expectation of reward from copyright protection, their mem-
bers lose the institutional incentive to produce artistic works. While some of
these artists will of course find other incentives to create, 7 many of these artists
will lack the copyright incentive toward fixation, given the ultimately impotent
protection that fixation may seem to offer. Why undertake to record your crea-
tive output if recordation provides you little or no benefit, and indeed, may even
make it easier for those who enjoy the full franchise to misappropriate your cre-
ations? Nonetheless, whereas fixation might hold little appeal for some disen-
franchised creators, it remains vital to the broad distribution of copyrighted
works and other copyright social utility objectives. 2
In addition to the hazard of "fixation disincentive," the systemic copy-
right disenfranchisement of marginalized authors can also engender conditions
of "artistic xenophobia." Some marginalized artists are likely to become wary
of sharing their works with the general public, fearful of losing control over
their creations or the commercial profits their works might generate. While
some of these artists might sustain their creative output, they might nonetheless
restrict public access to their work, a particularly pernicious result in the digital
age of Internet dissemination and exchange.73
Finally, putting aside the direct impact upon copyright social utility,
there is the basic question of protection of fundamental rights. In the post-Civil
Rights Era, American society has acknowledged that certain fundamental rights
and liberties must be guaranteed as a matter of fact as well as a matter of law. 4
Given that the mechanism of exclusive rights is one explicitly provided for in
the Constitution as a means through which Congress is empowered to pursue an
important social engineering objective, it would seem that systemic vitiation and
71 See Aoki, supra note 54, at 760-61.
72 NIMMER & NIMMER, supra note 2, at See. 102: Saadi, supra note 1, at 347 ("[W]hen a per-
former obtains the right to use a rock & roll composition, he has by default also obtained the right
to impersonate those aspects of the original performance which contributed at least as much as the
underlying composition to the success of the original recording. In effect, Congress has created a
disincentive to creativity by refusing to recognize a recording artist's role in musical creation.
Why should a recording artist be eager to create new recordings when he has no legal recourse
against the financial harms imposed by imitators?").
73 Kevin C. Earle, Ao-Copy Technology and the Copyright Act: Has the AMusic Industry Been
Allowed to Go Too Far in Diminishing the Consumers' Personal Use Rights in the Digital
World?, 2 J. MARSHALL REV. INTELL. PROP. L. 337, 352-53 (2003); Selena Kim, Reinforcement of
International Copyrightfor the DigitalAge, 16 INTELL. PROP. J. 93, 108 (2002).
74 See Caroline Mala Corbin, The First Amendment Right Against Compelled Listening, 89
B.U. L. REV. 939, 957 (2009); Green, supra note 53, at 289-90; Hoffman, supra note 53, at 1498;
Norchi, supra note 58, at 289 ("Nation-builders drafting constitutional texts and codified laws
must sift through both the myth system and the operational code in order to determine which
processes of community decisions are both authoritative and controlling. A newly drafted consti-
tution may be a myth while what people actually do in informal settings is the accepted code of
operation.").
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misappropriation of this mechanism demands both careful judicial scrutiny and
affirmative Congressional action.7 5
When an initiative intended to further copyright social utility fortuitous-
ly ameliorates conditions of copyright social injustice, it is generally accepted as
serendipitous. In a similar fashion, in specifically seeking a remedy for a prob-
lem of copyright social injustice, opportunities through which to preserve and
even augment copyright social utility can be revealed. 6
Curtailing institutionalized manipulations of the copyright law which
effectively disenfranchise minorities and the poor from its ambit, obviously
furthers the cause of copyright social justice and intellectual property empo-
werment. But an even cursory analysis of the problem illustrates how its correc-
tion is also vital to the Constitutional mandate of copyright social utility. Ensur-
ing that a fair portion of the proceeds from the exploitation of copyrighted
works will inure to the authors who create these works, particularly authors who
75 See Jamar, supra note 5, at 629 (arguing that equitable access to intellectual property is
essential in the digital information age and has thus should be accorded fundamental rights status);
Wong. supra note 52, at 809 14 (exploring copyrights as fundamental human rights): AYRES,
supra note 66, at 140-41.
76 See Aoki, supra note 54, at 800 ("In order to address exploitation, expanded IP rights may
help, but at the expense of extinguishing vibrant, communal cultural production. A key question
is whether it is possible for expanded IP rights and vibrant, communal cultural production to coex-
ist or whether the former makes the latter impossible. A syncretic legal sensibility that attempts to
dialogue with and engage preexisting difference and inequality related to that difference, instead
of subsuming alternate modes of cultural production. is crucial when approaching these issues.");
Chander & Sunder, supra note 52, at 574 ("We... argue here that the view of intellectual proper-
ty as serving only to incentivize more information production is too narrow. We offer a set of
arguments for an expansive understanding of the values motivating and structuring intellectual
property law. [For example s]purring different kinds of innovation. Even if we are interested
solely in spurring innovation, are we disinterested entirely in what kind of innovation we are
spurring? Does it matter if the intellectual property regime fails to incentivize the creation of
treatments for poor people's diseases? While some might prefer official technological neutrality,
governments often are keen to spur more socially useful inventions.") Chon, supra note 54, at
2831 32 ("Intellectual property. when it encounters development either domestically or globally,
must incorporate a more comprehensive understanding of social welfare maximization .... The
overall assessment of intellectual property's instrumental goal - the promotion of "Progress," at
least in the U.S. context - has been dominated of late by the assumption that pure wealth or
utility-maximization serves adequately to evaluate social welfare . . . . This approach dovetails
with the interests of intellectual property industries, whose short term goals of maximizing reve-
nue generation are not necessarily aligned with society's long term dynamic goals of maximizing
innovation . . . . Over-reliance on utility-maximization ignores distributional consequences.");
Wong. supra note 52. at 842 ("By moving away from a view of copyright premised on the owner-
ship of private property to one that focuses on access rights ... within a human rights context, we
shift our collective policy mindset away from the restraints of private property consequences (i.e.,
the right to exclude) toward one that is more open to considerations relating directly to [access to
knowledge] and development. This will facilitate a larger role for social and cultural norms and
values in determining the scope of copyright, not simply as an instrumental means of achieving
market efficiencies and providing related economic incentives, but more broadly as a society's
manifestation of how it balances different and potentially conflicting individual/societal and eco-
nomic/socio-cultural demands, needs and interests, in the name of overall development.").
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are members of marginalized and underserved groups, supports copyright social
utility, in so far as it reinforces the intended function of the authors' exclusive
property rights and encourages faith and participation in the copyright system.7
Where it can be shown that persistent or widespread social injustice di-
rectly impedes fulfillment of the Constitutional directive to promote literary and
artistic endeavor, remedial legislative and judicial action is appropriate to ensure
that the objectives of the Copyright Clause are satisfied.8 Evaluating issues of
copyright injustice through the lens of copyright social utility/social justice in-
terdependence illuminates legal resolutions that serve these twin progeny of the
copyright social engineering mandate. Moreover, a copyright social utili-
ty/social justice interdependence methodology promotes intellectual property
empowerment and related social advances, and can be particularly useful in
addressing these issues in the digital information age.
C. Copyright Social Utility/Social Justice Interdependence in the Digital
Age: the Digital Performance Right in Sound Recordings Act
Sensitivity toward copyright social utility/social justice interdependence
can be especially valuable in the digital information technology context, given
this technology's unique attributes for enhanced use of copyrighted material and
related copyright social utility benefits. This is sometimes evident in the incor-
poration of digital information technology into the copyright regime with re-
spect to the affect upon the traditional allocations of uses of copyrighted materi-
al as between authors and the public.
For example, the advent of digital information technology was at least
partially responsible for the reexamination of the historical treatment of per-
forming artists under the Copyright Act.79 For decades, performing artists oc-
77 See Peter K. Yu, The Copyright Divide, 25 CARDOZO L. REv. 331, 402 (2003) ("Copyright
Law has always been about stakeholders. In the late nineteenth century, Anthony Trollope blamed
American book piracy on 'the book selling leviathans.' A century later, Professor Jessica Litman
told us that 'the only way that copyright laws get passed in this country is for all of the lawyers
who represent the current stakeholders to get together and has out all of the details among them-
selves.' Since then, commentators have discussed at length the gaps between the 'copyright-rich'
and copyright poor and between the haves and have-nots in the copyright system .... Today, a
copyright divide exists between those who have stakes in the existing copyright regime and those
who do not. On one side of the divide are the stakeholders, who are eager to protect what they
have under the existing regime .... On the other side of the divide are the nonstakeholders. These
nonstakeholders neither understand nor believe in the copyright system .... Unless the nonstake-
holders understand why copyright needs to be protected and until they become stakeholders or
potential stakeholders. they will not be eager to abide by copyright laws or consent to stronger
copyright protection."). As discussed in Part 111. copyright social utility/social justice interdepen-
dence can therefore provide the doctrinal basis for affirmative initiatives, such as a copyright
unconscionability doctrine tailored to the underlying social objectives of the copyright law.
78 Intellectual Property and Social Justice, supra note 54, at 576.
79 Untangling the Web, supra note 8, at 675 ("The crisis in the music industry has been
brought about only in part by the digital revolution. The layering of copyright ownership interests
and the complexity of copyright law, particularly as it applies to music, has played a major role in
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cupied a copyright status inferior to that of lyricists and composers with respect
to the Act's recognition of an exclusive public performance right in sound re-
cordings:80 lyricists and composers enjoyed this property right but it was denied
to the performing artists who actually make sound recordings.8 ' Thus, whereas
lyricists and composers received royalties from radio broadcasts and other pub-
lic performances of the sound recordings that embodied their work, performing
artists received no such benefit.
8 2
the inability of the industry to respond to the changing nature of the ways in which digital works
can be distributed and otherwise exploited. The layering of copyright interests and the complexity
of the law began long before digital technology. Digital technology, however, has laid bare the
flaws of the current system that have been created by a process of accretion.").
so See Lawson. supra note 69. at 693 94 ("In the early 1960s, Barry Mann. Cynthia Weil. and
Phil Spector composed the lyrics and music for the song You've Lost That Lovin' Feelin', which
the Righteous Brothers originally recorded in 1964. Forty years and over eight million public
performances of the sound recording later, You've Lost That Lovin' Feelin' became the most
played song of all time on American radio and television. Despite the Righteous Brothers' signa-
ture sound largely driving the long-term popularity of Lovin' Feelin', the duo has never received a
single royalty check for any of the eight million nondigital transmissions. Mann, Weil, and Spec-
tor, however, have earned royalties for each of the eight million radio, television, and motion
picture public performances.") Saadi, supra note 1, at 338 39 ("[I]n spite of Congress's refusal to
recognize any natural rights foundation for copyright law, Congress has implied that the most
valuable part musical creativity is the creation of musical compositions, not the creation of sound
recordings. Furthermore, because the goal of copyright law is to promote the proliferation of the
arts by granting a monopoly to artists for a limited time, Congress has determined that original
renditions of musical compositions do not enhance or contribute to the artistic wealth of society in
denying this monopoly to sound recording artists.").
8 See June Chung, The Digital Performance Right in Sound Recordings Act and Its Failure to
Address the Issue of Digital Music's New Form of Distribution, 39 ARIz. L. REV. 1361, 1362-63
(1997) ("The Copyright Act differentiated between musical compositions and sound recordings.
It only granted copyright protection for performance rights to the former. This meant that the
right to prohibit any unlicensed public performance was held by the copyright owner of the under-
lying musical composition, but that the copyright owner of the sound recording did not have such
a right. These two owners are not always the same person. The copyright in the musical compo-
sition exists to protect the composer's notes and lyrics. On the other hand, a sound recording is
the result of combining the musical, spoken, and other sounds onto a disc or other format. With-
out copyright protection for the sound recording, the performer's actual recorded sounds of a piece
of music are not protected. Unfortunately, this left the owners of sound recordings with no legal
recourse if they encountered a copyright infringement of their works. Therefore, each time a song
was broadcast on the radio, the owner of the musical composition received royalty payments
while the owner of the actual sound recording had no right to receive any financial compensa-
tion."); Saadi. supra note 1, at 334-35 ("Two types of battles often erupt over sound recordings
and the rights that lie therein. One battle pits a recording artist's desire for protection the same
kind of protection accorded to composers against a blatant plagiarist's theft. The other battle
pits a recording artist's insistence upon artistic integrity against a businessman's greed. In either
case ... the recording artist has little legal recourse; American copyright law and related concepts
of intellectual property law clearly favor the composer over the recording artist, and business over
artistic integrity .... Our system seems to value the creative act of writing a song much more than
it appreciates the creative acts involved in recording a performance of that song.").
82 Chung, supra note 81, at 1363 ("Great debate arose after the passage of Copyright Act be-
cause the issue of a performance right in sound recordings was not addressed. Since 1976, Con-
gress had considered and rejected legislation to grant such a right on three separate occasions.
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This state of affairs seems particularly counterintuitive in light of the
fact that most contemporary radio listeners tend to tune in to hear their favorite
versions of musical works as recorded by particular performers, and not merely
to hear musical works performed by indiscriminate artists. A particularly
poignant example of performing-artist-inspired interest in a musical work is the
rendition of the Star Spangled Banner recorded by R&B recording legend Mar-
vin Gaye. Obviously the National Anthem was already well known to every
American when Gaye recorded it in 1984, but his unique interpretation of the
song sparked a popular interest in the work which had not been evident for some
time.
Ultimately. Congress declined to address this issue, in part, because the record industry had in-
creasingly profited since passage of the Copyright Act. The industry lobby had no persuasive
ammunition since the lack of a performance right in sound recordings had not created any eco-
nomic difficulty.").
83 See, e.g., Saadi. supra note 1. at 346 47 ("Unfortunately, against the backdrop of modern
popular music such as jazz and rock & roll, the present copyright system grossly oversimplifies
the relative roles of composer and performer. Modern music is more improvisational, and thus
gives the creativity of the performer free reign. Furthermore, in popular music, a written score's
description of the musical makeup of a song is limited because it is incapable of fully capturing
the essence of modern musical forms. The vocal intonations of an Elvis Presley defines modern
music at least as much as the written score of Leiber and Stoller."). Indeed, it is not uncommon
for a particular musical work to languish until recording by the "right" artist. Even especially well
known works can obtain new commercial and artistic vitality when reinterpreted and recorded by
a talented performing artist. Kara M. Wolke. Some Catching Up to Do: How the United States, In
Refusing to Fully Sign On to the WPPT's Public Performance Right in Sound Recordings, Fell
Behind the Protections of Artists' Rights Recognized Elsewhere in this Increasingly Global Music
Community, 7 VAND. J. ENT. L. & PRAC. 411, 414 (2005) ("Music adds creative value to society,
and as such, is a copyrightable commodity. The challenge to establishing a sound recording per-
formance right is to agree that recording artists contribute equally with songwriters to that creation
of value. Before lawmakers will agree that performers and producers are creative authors of a
useful art, constitutionally deserving of copyright protection in the form of a general performance
right equal to that afforded composers and songwriters, the deeply-rooted theoretical belief that
performing artists and producers are less valuable to the creative process must be overcome.").
84 MARVIN GAYE, THE MASTER: 1961-1984 (Motown 1995). See Lawson, supra note 69, at
694-95 ("In a variation of the Righteous Brothers' situation, members of the same musical group
may also earn different royalties from public performances of sound recordings. Paul Simon and
Art Garfunkel comprised one of the 1960s' most popular folk-rock duos, culminating in their ten-
week chart-topping album Bridge over Troubled Water. While Simon solely wrote the vast ma-
jority of the duo's material, undoubtedly each member's distinctive voice and personality also
contributed to Simon and Garfunkel's success, with most in the music industry agreeing that Gar-
funkel's high tenor was integral for recording their most popular songs. Despite Garfunkel's sig-
nificant contribution to the duo's long-term success, he has no copyright protection (thus no right
to demand royalties) in the public performances of Simon and Garfunkel sound recordings. Si-
mon, on the other hand, composed most of the duo's songs. entitling him to copyright protection
(thus possibly receiving royalties) for all public performances of those musical works."). Saadi,
supra note 1, at 346 ("This author believes that copyright law, which is so beneficial to composers
and yet so repugnant to recording artists, is perhaps not so much flawed as it is outdated. Copy-
right law originated in an era that predated recording devices. synthesizers, recording studios,
producers, phonorecords, and today's popular music. In an era long since gone, classical composi-
tions were at the heart of musical creation. In that period, performers were less involved with the
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A few scholars and commentators recognized the lack of a performing
artist's public performance right in sound recordings as a problem of copyright
social injustice,85 some emphasizing its disproportionate impact on African
86Americans and other marginalized groups. Prior to the Civil Rights Era, a
performance credit was often the only copyright acknowledgement that many
African American musical artists received. 87  This was often the case even
where the African American performer was also an author, because many white
promoters and agents took advantage of the fact that many African American
artists were illiterate, unable to read or write music, or simply bereft of socio-
legal bargaining power, and therefore substituted themselves as the authors of
creation of music than they are in 1997. This is not to say that the London Symphony Orchestra
and the Boston Pops do not impart their own creativity to the performance and recording of clas-
sical compositions such as Beethoven's Fifth Symphony they clearly do. Nevertheless, it is
difficult to dispute that the vast majority of the creative energy and the musical expression in
classical works lies in the written score, where music is meticulously described. Thus, the copy-
right system once accurately reflected composers' and performers' respective roles in the creation
of music, but has grown outdated in its prejudice against performers and recording artists of the
present.").
85 See, e.g., Lawson, supra note 69, 713-14 ("While a broadcaster transmitting a recently
released Eminem song may drive Eminem's record sales, the same cannot be said for older albums
because the exposure value diminishes over time. For instance, oldies stations continue to play
songs that have little, if any, current sales, and thus the artists of older works receive little, if any,
exposure value from the public performances of their sound recordings. However, the song is
nonetheless valued by the audiences that listen to, and the radio stations that prosper from, the
song's performance."); Saadi. supra note 1. at 338 39 ("Congress reasoned that section 114 would
permit multiple renditions of a composition to be recorded and distributed, and performance royal-
ties paid to the composer and publisher (but not the recording artist) would thereby be increased.
Congress's desire to reward songwriters but not recording artists with performance royalties im-
plies that there is little valuable artistry to be found in the recording process, and that the act of
musical creation does not extend beyond composition. This logic disregards the significance of
the recording artist's talent. style. and interpretation of a musical score. It denies the performer
his right to be recognized as an artistically important part of the creation of music: it treats the
recording artist as if he were merely a computer or player-piano, translating notes contained on
sheet music into audible form, imparting no feeling of his own into his performance."); Wolke,
supra note 83, at 412-13 ("From the largest record companies down to the newest performer
recording their first album, a full public performance right in sound recordings is necessary to
achieve legal, economic, and artistic equality for American performers and producers both at
home and abroad .... While owners of musical works enjoy exclusive performance rights, the
U.S. Copyright Act has historically denied equal rights to sound recording copyright owners.
These inequities are important because at some point in most performers' careers, their ability to
generate income from touring, merchandising. and record sales will decline, and except for the
digital performance right discussed earlier, the performer's income stream will dry up. Meanwhile,
a composer continues to collect royalties every time a song he or she wrote is performed public-
ly.").
86 Copynorms, supra note 54, at 1189 90: Kartha. supra note 61, at 232.
87 Jeffrey Melnick, Tin Pan Alley and the Black-Jewish Nation, in AMERICAN POPULAR MUSIC:
NEW APPROACHES TO THE TWENTIETH CENTURY 34 (Rachel Rubin & Jeffrey Melnick eds., 2001).
The identity of the artist performing on a recording is not easy to obscure. Of course, the racial
identity of black performers was often hidden to make the recording more marketable. See A
Legacy of Unequal Protection. supra note 53, at 380 83.
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the artist's work.88 The fact that members of minority and other marginalized
groups and classes were often denied the status of writer or composer and were
instead relegated to the category of performing artist likely contributed to the
disparate treatment of these copyright constituencies under the Copyright Act. 9
This inequitable state of affairs remained unchanged for decades until
the proliferation of digital information technology triggered an unexpected evo-
lution in the law. In the 1990s, members of the recording industry became fear-
ful that digital information technology would promote unauthorized copying of
digitally broadcast music and thereby undermine sales of music recordings. 90
Consequently, they lobbied Congress to pass laws to offset this result by provid-
ing for a royalty in connection with the public digital transmission of copy-
righted recordings. 91 In 1995, Congress responded by adopting the Digital Per-
formance Right in Sound Recordings Act, through which performing artists
88 Copynorms, supra note 54, at 1189-90. "Black artists were segregated into 'race record'
divisions of major record companies, and subjected to particularly onerous contracts .... Many
early blues artists were poor and illiterate: the Blues 'was created not just by black people but by
the poorest, most marginal black people ... [most of whom] . .. could neither read nor write."
Id. (quoting ROBERT PALMER, DEEP BLUES: A MusIcAL AND CULTURAL HISTORY OF THE
MIssIssIPPI DELTA 17 (1981)) (footnotes omitted). Even when these artists did receive author
credit, white promoters and agents would often add themselves as co-authors, notwithstanding the
fact that they had no creative involvement in writing or composing the material. Id. at 1193. In
many cases in which African American artists were not involved in writing or composing a work,
they were specifically recruited to provide R&B interpretations and other commercially viable
stylizations for the material. Id. Ironically, some of these situations involved a layer of gender
discrimination. For example, some female songwriters such as the legendary Carole King were
not considered commercially viable as performers and thus denied the opportunity to record their
own material. See Lady Sings the Blues. supra note 62. at 381. Thus, a white male promoter or
agent could combine the artistic talents of blacks and women and effectively determine the copy-
right status of all of the creative contributors, without making any copyright contribution of his
own. Aoki, supra note 54 at 755-56; A Legacy of Unequal Protection, supra note 53, at 343, 358.
89 Copynorms. supra note 54, at 1183 ("The treatment of black artists provides a wealth of
insight into core IP values, including incentive theory. optimal standards for creativity, and IP as
mechanism for distributive justice. Moreover, the treatment of black artists, much like that of
women, exposes the hidden context of subordination in the IP arena. The appropriation of the
creative output of black creators for a long period of U.S. history parallels the pervasive subordi-
nation of blacks generally under the color of law. Racial discrimination has produced unequal
access to capital, education, land and other entitlements under slavery and Jim Crow segregation.
Copyright law exists within social structures that historically did not serve the interests of black
cultural production." (footnote omitted)).
90 See Chung, supra note 81, at 1363; Untangling the Web, supra note 8, at 674.
9' NIMMER & NIMMER, supra note 2, at § 8B.01[C]; Chung, supra note 81, at 1384. "One
early step taken by Congress in dealing with the issue of copyright infringement was in another
musical realm: the Audio Home Recording Act. It was enacted to deal with new technology, such
as DAT recorders. The Audio Home Recording Act states that [n]o action may be brought under
this title alleging infringement of copyright ... based on the noncommercial use by a consumer of
(a digital audio recording device) for making digital musical recordings.' The Audio Home Re-
cording Act instead set off a portion of the revenues from the sale of such recording devices as
royalty for the recording industry's musical composition copyright holder, thereby avoiding the
issue of liability." Id. (quoting 17 U.S.C. § 1008 (1994)) (footnotes omitted).
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finally obtained a property right in connection with the public performance of
their recordings.9 2
By all accounts, Congress was motivated to adopt the Digital Perfor-
mance Right in Sound Recordings Act primarily because of concerns for copy-
right social utility - specifically, the need to adapt author/performing artist
93compensation incentives to the new realities of the digital information age.
However, while Congress may not have had a conscious social justice intent
motivating its action, the Digital Performance Right in Sound Recordings Act
nonetheless also enhances copyright social justice by correcting a copyright
94inequity, which also disproportionately impacted certain marginalized groups.
Of course, had Congress perceived the problem primarily as one of copyright
social injustice and adopted the Digital Performance Right in Sound Recordings
Act on that basis, the propitious effect upon copyright social utility (i.e., the
preservation of author/artist incentives) would have been the same. Sensitivity
toward copyright social utility/social justice interdependence can therefore illu-
minate multiple bases for (and additional constituencies affected by) specific
remedial copyright action and better assure that such action addresses the full
range of pertinent needs and issues.
92 See Chung. supra note 81, at 1361 ("President Clinton signed into law the Digital Perfor-
mance Right in Sound Recordings Act of 1995 ('Digital Performance Right Act'), which became
effective in January of 1996. This is the first law to grant a performance right in sound recordings
and to specifically address digital transmissions, which include cable networks as well as comput-
er transmissions." (footnotes omitted)); Untangling the Web, supra note 8, at 687-88; Wolke,
supra note 83, at 412.
93 See Chung, supra note 81. at 1365 ("The purpose behind the Act is two-fold. First, it will
work with the existing Copyright Act to provide added protection against copyright infringement
of digital music, specifically sound recordings. Second. it anticipates the possibility of a shift in
distribution of sound recordings from physical to digital. As an example of this second purpose,
the Senate Report to the Act commented on the fact that on-line services that allow subscribers to
download music 'on demand' pose the greatest threat to traditional sales of records and compact
discs. Since the copyright owners of sound recordings held the right to traditional sales prior to
the Digital Performance Right Act, it was only fair to provide comparable rights for negotiating
licenses for distribution of their copyrighted sound recordings over on-line services." (footnotes
omitted)); Untangling the Web, supra note 8. at 673 ("The music industry is in crisis. Infringe-
ment is rampant. with little sign of abating. Despite lawsuits against peer-to-peer file sharing
systems, new systems arise faster than old ones are shut down. Consumers are ripping and burn-
ing CDs with little regard for music copyright." (footnotes omitted)).
94 Moreover, some commentators have pointed to the potential for even greater social justice
benefits to argue in favor of full public performance rights, including some form of moral rights,
for sound recordings. See Lawson, supra note 69, at 714 ("A right of public performance could
possibly entail more than merely a right to receive royalties. For instance, an artist may wish that
his song not be played on certain types of radio stations, in certain geographic areas, or in sleazy
strip clubs; and, with a right of public performance, a performer could prevent disgraceful groups,
such as the Ku Klux Klan, from adopting the performer's song as rally music. A public perfor-
mance right could conceivably allow the artist to have more control over who publicly performs
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It is doctrinally pragmatic to examine problems of copyright social in-
justice for their impact on copyright social utility. 95 This approach does not
artificially transmogrify generic problems of social welfare into copyright di-
lemmas, but rather, acknowledges that certain social deficiencies gnaw at the
very foundations of copyright protection. In such cases, it is not only appropri-
ate to envision the copyright law as a tool for social justice, it is constitutionally
mandated that the law be applied to correct social inequity in deference to the
demands of copyright social utility. 96 Moreover, redressing these deficiencies
through the copyright law assures institutional responses consonant with the
specific social engineering function of the Copyright Clause. 9'
In exploring the concept of copyright social utility/social justice inter-
dependence, a solid Constitutional premise for achieving copyright social justice
is identified, and thus a foundation for affirmative copyright social justice poli-
95 See. e.g.. Chon, supra note 54, at 2912 ("If the instrumental mandate of intellectual property
law is truly to increase knowledge for positive purposes. then there must be fuller consideration of
the provision of basic needs and other global public goods such as food security, education, and
health care. Undernourished, diseased, dying, undereducated, or extremely impoverished popula-
tions are viewed by many as negative externalities both qualitatively and quantitatively more
serious than the danger of under-incentivizing authors and inventors. The latter is the externality
to which intellectual property law devotes its exclusive attention. This disjuncture over priorities
has highlighted an increasingly untenable intellectual solipsism of the intellectual property poli-
cymaking framework, as intellectual property globalization encounters ethical concerns associated
with development.").
96 This approach should not be construed to preclude redress for copyright social injustice
where the link to copyright social utility is tenuous. As acknowledged in Part II, Section A, co-
gent arguments can be made that equitable access to the benefits of the copyright law is an inde-
pendently inherent aspect of the Copyright Clause, bolstered by other provisions of the Constitu-
tion. The theory of copyright social justice/social utility interdependence merely provides a direct
connection to the express mandate to promote the progress of the literary arts.
97 See. e.g.. A Legacy of Unequal Protection, supra note 53. at 355 57 ("Theoretically. copy-
right functions to protect the creative output of authors, regardless of external social factors such
as race .... In practice, Blacks as a class received less protection for artistic musical works due to
(1) inequalities of bargaining power. (2) the clash between the structural elements of copyright
law and the oral predicate of Black culture, and (3) broad and pervasive social discrimination
which both devalued Black contributions to the arts and created greater vulnerability to exploita-
tion and appropriation of creative works."); Schultz & van Gelder, supra note 70, at 79-80 ("De-
spite the many other problems of poor countries, the struggles of creators and creative businesses
are worthy of attention .... [C]reative industries are a significant, but thus far largely unfulfilled,
opportunity for less-developed countries. Where abundant creative talent exists but local circums-
tances are otherwise trying, creative industries may be one of the best bets for economic develop-
ment. Creative sectors, particularly music, tend to rely less on sophisticated infrastructure or
capital-intensive investment. Potential is particularly abundant in Africa, where musical creativity
is rich, diverse, well loved, and constantly evolving while drawing on strong traditions. The de-
velopment of a popular music industry thus represents low-hanging fruit for most African econo-
mies. For creative industries to prosper the legal and business environment must be supportive,
but in this context, a supportive environment does not require massive, decades-long invest-
ment .... It would be [most] effective to concentrate on making the legal system. particularly
copyright law, function more effectively and on removing obstacles from the paths of creators and
entrepreneurs.").
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cies and stratagems is established. As explored in the next Part, the strategy of
Digital Entrepreneurship, which at its core embraces the nexus between the so-
cial utility function of the copyright law and the achievement of social justice, is
one that promotes intellectual property empowerment while preserving the so-
cial utility mandates of copyright protection.
PART III. DIGITAL ENTREPRENEURSHIP: A COPYRIGHT SOCIAL UTILITY/SOCIAL
JUSTICE INTERDEPENDENCE STRATEGY FOR THE DIGITAL INFORMATION AGE
A. Copyright Social Utility/Social Justice Interdependence and Digital
Information Technology
Digital information technology is the modern copyright commoditiza-
tion/social utility conflict metaphor.98 On the one hand, the technology offers
revolutionary copyright social utility benefits, including enhanced end-user
access to and interaction with copyrighted material. Today, access to a personal
computer is access to a growing global store of copyrighted and other creative
works, from which one can find the inspiration to create new works, or which
can be digitally cannibalized in the construction of new creative output. 99
98 See, e.g, Netanel, supra note 40, at 2 ("Commentators and courts have universally hailed
the Internet as an abundantly fertile field for self-expression and debate. But this acclamation
masks sharp disagreement over whether certain Internet activity should be lauded or deplored. A
prime example is the unlicensed use of copyright-protected material. The explosion of sharing
and remixing of popular songs and movies over Internet-based peer-to-peer ('P2P') networks like
Napster. KaZaA, and Morpheus has evoked sharply discordant reactions. Some commentators
embrace the collection, exchange, and transformation of existing works as part and parcel of the
individual autonomy, self-expression, and creative collaboration for which we celebrate the Inter-
net. Others denounce those activities as massive piracy of intellectual property. They fear that
P2P file swapping poses a mortal threat to the copyright system that sustains authors, artists, and a
multi-billion-dollar-a-year industry in the production and dissemination of creative expression.").
99 See Fair Usefor Computer Programs, supra note 10, at 102-03 ("[There is an] extraordi-
nary array of electronic information tools now available ... that permit users to experiment with
the plastic nature of works in digital form. By plasticity, I mean the ease with which such works
can be manipulated, transformed, and/or inserted into other works. Although many authors might
prefer for their works to remain as fixed as they have traditionally been in printed form, the genie
of plasticity cannot be pushed back into the bottle. Digital manipulation is here to stay. for the
manipulability of digital data is one of the key advantages of the digital medium.") (footnotes
omitted); Lawrence Lessig, Creative Economies, 2006 MICH. ST. L. REV. 33, 37 (2006) ("This is
digital creativity. This is digital remix .... Anybody with a $1,500 computer can take images and
sounds from the culture around us and remix them together to express ideas and arguments more
powerfully than anything any of us could write as text. This is remix with more than text, yet it is
the literacy of a twenty-first century. It is what kids do with computers once they are finished
hoarding all of the content that was ever produced in the history of man. When they grow bored
with the hoarding. what do they do next? They find things to do with the content they've collected
.... This is what they do. This is writing for them. It has extraordinary creative potential.");
Michael J. Madison, Social Software, Groups, And Governance, 2006 MICH. ST. L. REv. 153, 153
(2006) ("The 'personal computing' technology paradigm of the last twenty years has done much
to expand the scope of individual agency in the context of law and policy. Computers help indi-
viduals to create and consume information at unprecedented scale and at unprecedented speed.");
[Vol. 112
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Moreover, the benefits to be had not only promote copyright social utility, but
digital information technology holds the promise for unprecedented equitable
participation in the copyright system for all members of society, providing new
opportunities for previously marginalized groups to express themselves crea-
tively and otherwise profit from participation in the copyright regime.10 0
At the same time, however, digital information technology presents a
formidable challenge to traditional copyright compensation expectations. Be-
cause of the ease in which end-users of copyrighted works can engage in the
unauthorized digital reproduction, distribution, and other uses of such material,
"digital remix"''1 opportunities pose a genuine threat to copyright holder prop-
erty rights. 
02
Both copyright owners and copyright social activists offer solutions to
the digital commoditization/social utility conundrum. Many copyright holders
argue that there is no reason to upset the copyright status quo. As has always
been the case, copyright holders remain more than willing to license the use of
their works at whatever prices the market will support. 10 3 There is a real disin-
centive for copyright holders to demand too high a price, because if the required
license fee is so high that the licensee can't recoup her investment through sub-
Okediji. supra note 54. at 108 ("[I]nformation technology has empowered ordinary users to be-
come part of the creative process both by its interactive nature and the very architecture of the
pennon of the information society, the Internet.').
1oo Intellectual Property and Social Justice. supra note 54. at 572 ("[T]he digital revolution and
similar technological advances present unheralded opportunities though which to confront [intel-
lectual property social inequity] from a socially redeeming vantage point .... [T]he new technol-
ogies can provide the apparatus through which to achieve a more equitable distribution of the
benefits of creative endeavor. In order to attain these goals, however, it is necessary to reorient
our construction and application of the intellectual property law toward the aspiration of social
justice."). For statistics on the Digital Divide, see NAT'L TELECOMMS. & INFO. ADMIN., FALLING
THROUGH THE NET 1i: NEW DATA ON THE DIGITAL DIVIDE, available at
http://www.ntia.doc.gov/ntiahome/net2/falling.html.
101 "Digital remix" refers to the digital use of copyrighted material in the development of new
creative expression. See Lawrence Lessig, Free(ing) Culture for Remix, 2004 UTAH L. REV. 961,
965 (2004) [hereinafter Free(ing) Culture]; Robert P. Merges, Copyright, Creativity, Catalogs:
Locke Remixed ;-). 40 U.C. DAVIS L. REV. 1259 (2007) [hereinafter Locke Remixed].
102 SunTrust Bank v. Houghton Mifflin Co., 268 F.3d 1257, 1261 (11 th Cir. 2001) ("The Copy-
right Act promotes public access to knowledge because it provides an economic incentive for
authors to publish books and disseminate ideas to the public." (citation omitted)) Peter S. Menell,
Can Our Current Conception of Copyright Law Survive in the Internet Age?, 46 N.Y.L. SCH. L.
REV. 63, 99 102 (2002 2003) [hereinafter Survive in the Internet Age?]; Pollack, supra note 15,
at 2445, 2446 ("Digitization of copyrighted materials permits instantaneous, simplified copying
methods that produce nearly perfect copies of originals. These copies can be digitally delivered to
thousands of Internet users. Decentralization and anonymity in cyberspace have allowed for the
widespread dissemination of copyrighted materials without permission from their owners.").
103 See generally Netanel. supra note 40. at 77.
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sequent sales or re-licensing to end-users, she will simply forego the use and
neither party will benefit.
114
The problem with these arguments, however, is that immediate profit
from the license at hand is not always the copyright holder's priority. Proposed
licensee uses might compete with pre-existing products and drive the copyright
owner from a dominant position in the market. ° 5 Even where the copyright
holder is unopposed to licensing a new digital use, some infant markets take
time to gain commercial momentum and could be significantly delayed or even
abandoned if the start-up costs are commercially prohibitive.10 6 And of course,
some digital uses have enormous creative or social significance but little or no
commercial value; in such cases even a modest license fee could preclude an
innovative or socially significant digital use of copyrighted material.
10 7
104 See, e.g., Peter Jaszi, Toward a Theory of Copyright: The Metamorphoses of "Authorship"
1991 DUKE L.J. 455, 462 (1991) ("[A]lthough it is traditional to view copyright doctrine as a
battle between the interests of copyright owners ... and copyright users, in practice, those inter-
ests are remarkably congruent. Both sellers and buyers have a considerable stake in the mainten-
ance of an orderly market with plentiful supplies of new works at reasonable prices.").
105 See, e.g., Netanel, supra note 40, at 77-78 ("[C]opyright industries have repeatedly exhi-
bited a path-dependent resistance to licensing or engaging in new technological methods of ex-
ploitation that might endanger their traditional profit centers. Indeed, they have a long history of
seeking to reap monopoly rents through anticompetitive collusion, blocking new entrants, and
paying off gatekeepers for consumer attention. In the multimedia and Internet contexts, copyright
industries have also engaged in protracted cross-sectoral turf battles, leaving would-be licensees
with the highly complex, costly task of seeking multiple, overlapping permissions. This institu-
tional conservatism and balkanization does not inspire confidence that, if only given control, the
industries would make their full store of cultural expression readily available at reasonable pric-
es."); Raymond T. Nimmer, Licensing in the Contemporary Information Economy, 8 WASH. U.
J.L. & POL'Y 99, 145 (2002) ("A person who controls information may elect not to distribute the
information . . . .Unless mandatory disclosure laws govern, the law protects that decision.");
Travis, supra note 54. at 786 90.
106 Netanel, supra note 40, at 25-27; Travis, supra note 54, at 773-75, 794. See also Untan-
gling the Web, supra note 8, at 698-99 ("Three significant problems are evident in the picture [of]
the music industry. First, as a result of the dual layer of copyrights and the divided rights granted
to each owner, there are too many vested industry players for downstream users to be able to
efficiently obtain the authorizations needed for downstream use of recorded music. Second, the
divisible yet overlapping rights granted to copyright owners leads to industry gridlock and prob-
lems with holdout behavior. Finally, the demands for payment from the downstream user by too
many vested industry players, combined with industry consolidation, result in the price being too
high to achieve the goal of copyright. In the words of economists, the music industry is full of
market failures.").
107 See, e.g., Netanel. supra note 40, at 79 ("Not surprisingly ... copyright industries resist
providing no-cost or reduced-price licenses for non-profit. non-commercial, and educational uses.
Mid-level decision makers in copyright industry firms often apparently prefer to deny a low-price
license outright - or simply to ignore such licensing requests - than to devote the time required
for individualized treatment or to risk a supervisor's wrath for having granted a discount from
standard pricing. This resistance arises partly from the vagaries of decision making in a large
organization. But it may also make perfect economic sense for the copyright industry firm; at
some point the costs of setting and administering differential pricing outweigh the revenues the
firm can expect to reap from such a regime."); Travis, supra note 54. at 801 02.
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Some proponents of copyright social utility argue that aggressive invo-
cation and even expansion of the Fair Use Doctrine to circumvent copyright
holder exclusive rights is the best way to preserve copyright social utility in the
digital age. 08 Digital reuse of copyrighted works is undeniably beneficial to the
primary objective of the copyright law, the promotion of literary and artistic
expression, 10 9 and thus should be prioritized over property right/incentive objec-
tives. While these arguments are not without appeal, this approach to the issue
is equally problematic. First, there is the long term impact on the copyright in-
centive scheme and the potential of reducing artistic output.110 Second, erosion
108 See generally Netanel, supra note 40, at 74-75 ("Some commentators contend that [unre-
stricted digital use] would greatly benefit all but entrenched copyright industries. They emphasize
that our use of existing expression is a social good, whether seen in market terms as the satisfac-
tion of consumer wants or in liberal democratic terms as an instance of personal liberty, self-
definition, and self-expression. And they argue that the extension of copyright and content
providers' technological control - into personal free use zones has no justification. Copyright,
they posit, operates primarily to protect traditional content distributors - record labels, book
publishers, and movie studios - far more than creators. That protection might have been war-
ranted in the brick-and-mortar world, when content distribution required massive investments in
money and labor. But peer-to-peer networks, they maintain, render middleman-content-
distributors, and thus copyright, obsolete. In the digital universe, in fact, copyright serves as a
vehicle for media conglomerates to entrench their market position and expressive power. The
copyright industries have employed copyright infringement litigation to stifle peer-to-peer net-
works and dry up financing for new media enterprises that threaten industry dominance. Copy-
right also distorts our expressive universe by rewarding marketing muscle rather than spurring
creation. Digital abandon, the commentators maintain, would beneficially undermine copyright
industry entrenchment and distortion without unduly reducing incentives for authors."). See also
Okediji. supra note 54: Thi Phan, supra note 56; Travis. supra note 54.
109 See LAWRENCE LESSIG, THE FUTURE OF IDEAS 136 (2d ed. 2002) ("We have the potential to
expand the reach of creativity to an extraordinary range of culture and commerce. Technology
could enable a whole generation to [create] - remixed films, new forms of music, digital art, a
new kind of storytelling, writing, a new technology for poetry, criticism, political activism- and
then, through the infrastructure of the Internet, share that creativity with others. This is the art
through which free culture is built.").
110 See NIMMER & NIMMER, supra note 2, at 13; Alfred C. Yen, Restoring the Natural Law:
Copyright As Labor and Possession, 51 OHIO ST. L.J. 517, 518 (1990) ("Copyright is necessary
because in its absence those interested in using the author's work would simply copy the work
instead of buying it from the author. Authors would then find their economic returns too small to
justify the costs of authorship. In such a situation authors might not produce. and social welfare
would presumably suffer. To remedy this problem. economic theory supports granting authors
copyright in their works ...."): Fair Use Standard, supra note 9, at 1107 08 ("Copyright is in-
tended to increase and not to impede the harvest of knowledge .... The rights conferred by copy-
right are designed to assure contributors to the store of knowledge a fair return for their la-
bors .... [The Constitution's grant of copyright power to Congress] 'is a means by which an
important public purpose may be achieved. It is intended to motivate the creative activity of au-
thors and inventors by the provision of a special reward .... The monopoly created by copyright
thus rewards the individual author in order to benefit the public."' (citations omitted); Litman,
supra note 18. at 43 ("This is the central justification for further enhancing the rights in the copy-
right bundle: without strong copyright protection. there will be no national information infrastruc-
ture. The public might believe that what it wants is unfettered access to copyrighted works in
return for reasonable royalty payments to authors, but, if we let the public set the freight charges,
we risk underproduction of freight. If authors and publishers cannot reliably control their works,
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of copyright property rights could also undermine copyright social justice, by
rendering the new generation of digital copyright authors, re-mixers, and entre-
preneurs vulnerable to unjust exploitation in the future.' While subsequent
artists may visualize the creative possibilities for the reuse of "remix," it is like-
ly that major copyright conglomerates will reap the ultimate commercial bene-
fits from "relaxed" copyright protection in the digital context through mass pro-
duction of remix works. 12 In so far as African American and other marginalized
authors and artists are concerned, this would merely begin the cycle of unjust
exploitation anew.
The application of copyright social justice/social utility interdependence
theories provides a more palatable solution to the digital commoditization/social
utility copyright conundrum. This approach taps directly into the inherent fea-
tures of digital information technology and emphasizes symbiotic mechanisms
to promote both copyright social utility and social justice. 113 Digital Entrepre-
they will decline to make them available at all."); Netanel. supra note 40, at 75 76 ("[M]any
expressive works full-length motion pictures. novels, investigative journalism, and others
require a sufficiently material commitment of time and money such that far fewer would be
created without some mechanism for compensating authors. Of equal, related importance is copy-
right's structural role in our system of free expression. Copyright underwrites a sector of profes-
sional, market-supported authors and publishing enterprises that serves as the cornerstone for a
robust, independent press. It helps them garner the where-withal they need to stand up to gov-
ernment officials, corporations, political parties, and other centers of state and private power.
Historically, copyright served to liberate authors from heavy-handed aristocratic patronage by
providing them with a potential livelihood from paying audiences. In a liberal democratic society
that rightly places a premium on free speech and free press, there remain substantial benefits to
funding the creation and dissemination of many expressive works, and to funding them from
sources other than state subsidy, corporate munificence, and party patronage.").
M See Benoliel. supra note 64, at 50 51 ("Copyright law neither should be designed to pro-
mote the well-being of private parties or specific categories of people nor should it be connected
to ends that advance a sectored societal goal or the creation of another market to explore. At
times there may be a lack of understanding among fairness scholars of what, given the present
constitutional copyright framework, distributive justice is most efficient in promoting. Any appli-
cation of distributive justice ultimately is done at the expense of a given sector of the public and
diminishes the size of the general market, against the purpose of copyright law. The general histo-
ry of copyright law, and of the Copyright Clause of the Constitution in particular, clearly reveals
that copyright exists for the benefit of the public welfare. Thus, its goal should not be to advance
specific sectors of society or distinct markets."): Locke Remixed, supra note 101. at 1262 ("1 think
remix culture has great potential. But I disagree about its implications for copyright. I do not
think remix culture ought to force deep, fundamental, and permanent change in the structure of
copyright law. First, I do not think such change is necessary; high enforcement costs and market
competition will neutralize much of the potential for copyright law to bog down remix culture.
Second, it would not be fair to the people who create original mass market content for remixers to
Iredistribute' too much of the money creators earn from their work.").
112 Noah Balch, The Grey Note, 24 REv. LITIG. 581, 607 (2005); Fredrich N. Lim, Grey Tues-
day Leads to Blue Monday? Digital Sampling of Sound Recordings After the Grey Album, 2004 U.
ILL. J.L. TECH. & POL'Y 369, 377-80 (2005).
H, Peter Jaszi, Caught in the Net of Copyright, 75 OR. L. REv. 299, 300 (1996) ("Net user's
understanding of rights and duties, grounded as that understanding is in an ethic of information
sharing .... Information is a special kind of property, one which - unlike a ball or a jacket -
[Vol. 112
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neurship is one such affirmative copyright social justice/social utility interde-
pendence strategy, tailored specifically toward the demands of the digital infor-
mation age.
B. Digital Entrepreneurship: An Affirmative Copyright Social Utili-
ty/Social Justice Interdependence Strategy
Digital Entrepreneurship strategies are constructed to accomplish con-
sciously that which the Digital Performance Right in Sound Recordings Act
achieved fortuitously. Broadly defined,1 4 Digital Entrepreneurship involves the
application of traditional entrepreneurial tenets and principles, which have long
been utilized in the service of social uplift and advancement,' 15 to the cause of
intellectual property empowerment in the digital context. Adapting these tenets
and principles to the specific social utility/social justice function of the copy-
right law, Digital Entrepreneurship affirmatively seizes upon the copyright law
as an instrument for social change.
Implementation of Digital Entrepreneurship begins with the develop-
ment of a program of grassroots intellectual property legal activism and com-
munity pedagogy, including education as to the commercial potential of fixed
improves, rather than degrades. with use .... The understanding of rights in information which
traditionally has characterized American copyright one in which the public interest in reasona-
ble access to information has been afforded as much weight. in balancing. as the private interest in
control.").
114 The term "Digital Entrepreneurship" was coined by Professor Michael Risch, the WEST
VIRGINIA LAW REVIEW, and the Entrepreneurship. Innovation and Law Program in composing a
descriptive title for the present Symposium. Given the theme and scope of the Symposium, an
over-arching definition centered on the role of digital information technology in the creation of
entrepreneurial opportunities in the field of intellectual property seems appropriate; it is by no
means, however, the only legitimate or even viable definition for the term. A review of the ar-
ticles published as part of this Symposium highlights other approaches to providing analytical
parameters and a cohesive structure for the concept.
1 15 See Empowerment Strategies, supra note 66, at 409; Sherman Rogers, The Black Quest for
Economic Liberty: Legal, Historical, and Related Considerations, 48 How. L.J. 1, 9, 57-58
(2004) [hereinafter Black Quest] ("Historical data reveals African American entrepreneurial activ-
ity at the incipient stages of the nation's development in the 1600s. One historian determined that a
conservative estimate of the collective wealth of the nearly 500,000 free African Americans on the
eve of the Civil War was approximately $ 50 million . . . . The sociology of entrepreneurship
examines the tendency of ethnic minorities to engage in business enterprise because of their ex-
clusion from positions of political influence and subordination to a group of rulers. It is the soci-
ology of self-help through entrepreneurial activities. [Max] Weber observed that national or reli-
gious minorities who are in a position of subordination to the ruling class are likely to be driven
into economic activity because of their exclusion from positions of political influence .... [Edna]
Bonacich's research ... established that disfavored ethnic groups achieved economic security by
playing the middleman position within the structure of capitalism. Middlemen occupations include
positions such as labor contractors, rent collectors, money lenders, and brokers. As middlemen,
they negotiate property transactions between producers and consumers, owners and renters, the
elite and the masses, and employers and employees. Hostility to these ethnic minorities forces
them to operate on the fringes of the economic system.").
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creative expression and the attendant significance of obtaining and enforcing
comprehensive intellectual property protection for such work. Program design
and instruction could be undertaken by practicing attorneys, law professors, and
law students on a pro bono basis, and through collaboration with local civic,
religious, and similar community leaders and institutions, these programs could
successfully target marginalized and underserved groups and communities.1
6
While most laypersons readily appreciate the entrepreneurial signific-
ance of acquiring a trade skill 1 7 or opening a small business,118 few routinely
116 See, e.g., Christine Haight Farley, Peter Jaszi, Victoria Phillps, Joshua Sarnoff, & Ann Shal-
leck, Clinical Legal Education and the Public Interest in Intellectual Property Law, 52 ST. Louis
U. L.J. 735, 736 (2008) ("Quizzical looks as to the existence of a public interest in IP and the
power of clinical pedagogy propelled us to create an educational experience in which students
could reflect on the meaning of the public interest within IP law and policy, while learning the
complexities of being a lawyer .... [T]he 1990s saw a distinct acceleration in the trend toward
'high-protectionism' in copyright, patent, and trademark law, and [American University Washing-
ton College of Law] IP faculty members became increasingly involved in opposing that trend in
the courts, Congress, and international bodies. So it seemed like a natural extension of our existing
activities to create a clinic in which students could learn about the relationships among IP theories,
policies, and practices. in particular those that implicate the public interest; developments in the
statutory. regulatory, and doctrinal frameworks effecting momentous changes in IP law; the prac-
tices of IP lawyers and the experiences of those who seek IP protection or who feel the legal
regimes of IP impinging on their ability to engage in educational, creative, innovative, and cultu-
rally significant work."). Copynorms, supra note 54, at 1179 ("Unlike employment or educational
practices, the copyright system and discrimination in the arts, has never received the intense scru-
tiny of progressive attorneys seeking to combat and redress discrimination .... A society which
subjected Blacks to many types of invidious discrimination was unquestionably affected when
Blacks started to receive vigorous legal representation in the civil rights area. Similarly. it seems
clear that had the Black blues, jazz. and rock/soul artists of past eras received honest and vigorous
legal representation. the pattern of appropriation might have been stopped."). In addition to out-
right IP clinic options. there are a number of IP Empowerment outreach programs designed to
promote IP social justice initiatives such as community IP education and diversity in the IP legal
profession. See, e.g., The Center for Intellectual Property,
http://www.umuc.edu/distance/odell/cip/cip.shtml (last visited Oct. 18, 2009); The Center for Law
and Innovation, http://www.lawandinnovation.org (last visited Oct. 18, 2009); The Institute for
Intellectual Property & Social Justice, http://www.iipsj.org (last visited Oct. 18, 2009). Of course,
the Internet generally provides a plethora of web based community IP education initiatives. See,
e.g.. ELECTRONIC FRONTIER FouND., EFF Launches "Teaching Copyright" to Correct Entertain-
ment Industry Misinformation, May 27, 2009, http://www.eff.//archives/2009/05/27: NYMusic-
Copyright.org. A Copyright Resource for New York Musicians, http://nymusiccopyright.org (last
visited Oct. 18, 2009).
117 Black Quest, supra note 115. at 63 ("The 'real business group' [in the segregated black
communities] was the pool of about 3,000 black undertakers, making up nearly ten percent of all
undertakers. [Gunar] Myrdal notes that black undertakers had a monopoly in this line of business
because white undertakers did not want to touch the bodies of deceased blacks. This was especial-
ly true in the South. Black undertakers were successful, even though they never handled white
funerals, because black people tended to spend lavishly on funerals irrespective of their economic
plight. Black barbers, beauticians, and hairdressers tended to be successful for the same reasons;
in 1930, there were 34,000 black entrepreneurs and employees in this line of work, constituting
about ten percent of all such workers in the country.").
18 Id. at 95-96 ("Black businesses, excluding insurance companies and banks, fell into four
main categories by 1930: (1) amusement and recreational enterprises; (2) real estate businesses;
[Vol. 112
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consider the development of intellectual property as a means toward socio-
economic uplift. Certainly there are scores of amateur artists who see their talent
as an avenue to fame and fortune, but even they often fail to place sufficient
emphasis on intellectual property ownership in their long-term plans. 1 19 Of
course, even the most legally savvy unknown will lack the bargaining leverage
to secure especially favorable terms in connection with the mass production,
marketing, and distribution of her creative output, much the same as any unpro-
ven entrepreneur seeking start-up capital investment. Nonetheless, equipped
with at least a working knowledge of the applicable intellectual property rights
and protections, and of the intellectual property commoditization system as a
whole, the marginalized amateur creator can negotiate her initial agreements
more effectively, or at least negotiate strategically with respect to future agree-
ments, when her bargaining position is likely to have improved. 121
In addition to understanding the commoditization potential of intellec-
tual property endeavor, marginalized creators and communities must be tho-
roughly apprised as to the unique role that digital information technology can
(3) retail trade enterprises and (4) businesses providing personal services. The largest number of
successful black enterprises were those providing personal services, 'restaurants, beauty parlors,
barber shops and funeral parlors.' . . . An overwhelming number of emerging black businesses
which engage in providing some sort of personal service continue to be solely owned by the
founder or his successor. In 1987, for example, sole proprietors owned 94.4% of all black firms.
These figures are consistent with 1982 and 1977 statistics, which indicate that 95% and 94.3% of
black-owned businesses were sole proprietorships in those years.").
119 A Legacy of Unequal Protection, supra note 53, at 356. Moreover, even those artists who
consider IP ownership rights often overlook the potential for derivative work and related IP mar-
kets, from action figures to publicity rights. Carlisle George, and Jackie Scerri, Web 2.0 and
User-Generated Content: Legal Challenges in the New Frontier, J. OF INFO., L. & TECH., § 4.1
(2007); Lucille M. Ponte, Preserving Creativity from Endless Digital Exploitation: Has the Time
Come for the New Concept of Copyright Dilution?, 15 B.U. J. Sci. & TECH L. 34, 57 (2009).
120 Black Quest, supra note 115, at 99-100, 110 ("[Seventy-five percent] of black entrepreneurs
state that that they have encountered some discrimination in obtaining bank financing. In 1982,
69% of black owners started their businesses without borrowing money. It is estimated that the
gap between the capital available to blacks and that which whites can employ is over S 200 mil-
lion and projected to grow at a rate of $13.8 million a year .... African Americans have always
found it more difficult to obtain capital to start, maintain, and grow their business enterprises
largely due to discrimination and social realities. This history of discrimination has forced African
American entrepreneurs to rely on bootstrapping. the art of learning to do more with less, as a
routine matter.").
121 For example. in the recording industry, many a new recording artist will place undue em-
phasis on signing bonuses and other "upfront" payments. and fail to plan for the time when her
popularity will wane (and the record company will be less likely to grant royalty advances or
underwrite daily expenses). For many artists, this can be an extremely vulnerable moment in their
careers, and lifetime royalty streams are often signed away for desperately needed lump-sum cash
payments. I've advised new artists to negotiate for guaranteed multi-year salaries to be paid out of
gross revenues throughout the term of the initial contract, in lieu of a signing bonus if necessary.
Such terms can provide some future security, particularly when the "hit" releases are no longing
coming and the parties are locked in long term struggles over accountings and the artist is without
alternative sources of income.
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play in the development of original copyrightable expression and in offering
alternative commercialization mechanisms to those controlled by the creative
distribution conglomerates. 22 To be sure, in many cases, traditional corporate
licensing opportunities will provide the best development and marketing options
for an undiscovered creator; 123 however, digital exposure can create the kind of
public following that can trigger a corporate licensing proposition, enhance
creator bargaining leverage, or provide confirmation as to a market and revenue
base worthy of the pursuit an independent, entrepreneurial venture.
24
Equally important as education regarding the creation and protection of
original copyrightable expression is knowledge of the public's rights and privi-
leges to use preexisting creative material, both with respect to material in the
public domain as well as the Fair Use and/or de minimis use of material under
copyright.12  Many members of marginalized communities (indeed, many
Americans period) 26 are unaware of their entitlement to these "free" resources,
122 See, e.g.. Chung. supra note 81. at 1371 72 ("The Internet is potentially the way people will
conduct commerce in the next century. Although Internet commerce is in its early stages, 'some
observers predict that the volume of commercial transactions on the Internet will rise to over $200
billion in the year 2000.' ... Also, there are new Web sites created daily. Web browsers, such as
Netscape, makes it possible for consumers to find and retrieve information 'in graphical, audio
and video form.' . . . Additionally, in regards to cassettes and compact discs, the costs of mass
reproduction and transportation to traditional record stores will be eliminated since the consumer
can download the music directly from the Web sites of various record companies."); Matthew
Fagin. Frank Pasquale, & Kim Weatherall. Beyond Napster: Using Antitrust Law to Advance and
Enhance Online Music Distribution, 8 B.U. J. ScI. & TECH. L. 451. 457 58 (2002): ("Digital tech-
nology has made the reproduction and dissemination of copyrighted works infinitely easier and
almost costless. Each digital copy is identical, and is therefore capable of generating infinite fur-
ther reproductions. Once networked, everyone is a potential 'publisher' - not only to a few
friends, but to millions."); Sharon Sandeen, In For A Calf... The Right of Anonymity/E-
Commerce, 29 HASTINGS CONST. L.Q. 527, 534-36 (2002) ("On the Internet, it is also possible to
launch online advertising with very little capital .... Once an Internet sales campaign is devel-
oped, the incremental costs to send solicitations to thousands, if not millions, of Internet users is
marginal .... Unlike companies who purchase print, radio and television advertisements, if you
choose to establish your own web site or engage in e-mail solicitations you can do so without
paying someone else for the placement of your advertisements.... As with the expansion of the
railroads, improvements to mail service, and the development of the telegraph and the telephone,
the Internet has enabled the further decentralization of business and a corresponding increase in
remote contracting. Remote contracting has existed for centuries, but the Internet makes it much
easier for individuals and companies to purchase goods and services from businesses that are
located around the world.").
123 Ponte, supra note 119, at 63-64.
124 See Benoliel. supra note 64, at 59 60.
125 See, e.g.. Ann Bartow. Electrifying Copyright Norms and Making Cyberspace More Like a
Book, 48 ViL. L. REv. 13 (2003): COMM. ON INTELLECTUAL PROP. RIGHTS & THE EMERGING INFO.
INFRASTRUCTURE, NAT'L RESEARCH COUNCIL, THE DIGITAL DILEMMA: INTELLECTUAL PROP. IN THE
INFo. AGE 16-18 (2000).
126 See, e.g., Robert Brauneis, Copyright and the World's Most Popular Song, 56 J. COPYRIGHT
SoC'y U.S.A., No. 2 3. 335 (2009) (discussing the Byzantium copyright history of "Happy Birth-




West Virginia Law Review, Vol. 112, Iss. 1 [2009], Art. 7
https://researchrepository.wvu.edu/wvlr/vol112/iss1/7
2009] COPYRIGHT SOCIAL UTILITY AND SOCIAL JUSTICE INTERDEPENDENCE 145
or are skeptical of its reminiscence to the promise of forty acres and a mule.
Nonetheless, from the musical Wicked to the film Clueless to the disco hit A
Fifth of Beethoven,12 7 public domain material has been successfully exploited on
a grade scale by those who are aware of its availability. 12' Not only are members
of marginalized communities equally entitled to profit from this bounty, but
there is a sense of social gratification to be had in providing the descendants of
victims of copyright injustice the opportunity to sip from the cup of communal
creative works in the cause of their own socio-economic advancement.
Finally, in addition to the exploitation of the public domain and the le-
gally sanctioned use of works in copyright, there is the matter of creative entre-
preneurial use of protected material without the imprimatur of the copyright
public use rights and privileges. There are cogent arguments to the affect that in
light of past injustices, it is only fair that members of marginalized groups be
allowed wide latitude in connection with the unauthorized use of copyrighted
works. 129 There is much merit to this position. As a pervasive intellectual prop-
erty empowerment strategy, however, the efficacy of such an approach is li-
mited.
For one thing, the courts continue to hold firm that unauthorized digital
use of copyrighted material, even in the absence of commercial exploitation,
will be punished as copyright infringement. 30 Perhaps more to the point, such
weakening of copyright property rights may not be in the long term interests of
the budding generation of digital entrepreneurs. Traditional entrepreneurial te-
nets contemplate long term as well as immediate socio-economic advance
through the development, ownership, and commercial exploitation of individual
resources.13 In the context of Digital Entrepreneurship, this necessarily entails
preservation of the copyright entrepreneur's traditional exclusive rights. Copy-
right social activists should therefore be wary of "digital free use" initiatives,
given the American tradition of majority imitation of minority innovation. 132 As
many an African American rap artist has begun to appreciate, she who samples
127 These highly successful adaptations were of course based on Frank L. Baum's The Wizard
of Oz, Jane Austin's Emma, and Beethoven's Fifth Symphony, well after these classic works had
passed into the public domain.
128 See, e.g.. Eldred v. Ashcroft, 537 U.S. 186. 193 94 (2003); Golan v. Gonzales, 501 F.3d
1179, 1182 (10th Cir 2007).
129 See Anyanwu, supra note 61, at 198-99 (arguing that rap music sampling serves an educa-
tional function in the dissemination of African American culture and thus should be allowed under
the Fair Use Doctrine as an educational use); Copynorms, supra note 54. at 1217 ("If the music
industry is serious in its rhetoric about "theft" of iP, it should atone for the theft it itself has facili-
tated. The entertainment industry is arguably the prime beneficiary of special interest intellectual
property legislation that seeks compensation for even trivial uses of intellectual property.").
130 See, e.g., Capitol v. Thomas, 579 F. Supp. 2d 1210, 1227-28 (D. Minn. 2008); see also
Bridgeport Music, Inc. v. Dimension Films, 383 F.3d 390 (6th Cir. 2004).
131 Black Quest, supra note 115, at 21-24, 45-46.
132 See supra Part II.B.
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today shall herself be sampled tomorrow.133 Lest digital information technology
be molded into a means for the repetition of past institutionalized injustice,
wholesale digital free use/reuse amendments to copyright property rights should
be eschewed. 134
In sum, Digital Entrepreneurship strategies can promote copyright so-
cial utility and social justice by way of the existing regime and not in defiance
of it. 135 Indeed, not only can lawyers, policy makers, and social activists play a
critical role in furthering this agenda, but courts should consider these factors in
pertinent Fair Use cases. Creative albeit unauthorized entrepreneurial use of
copyrighted material which inures to the benefit of copyright social utility/social
justice interdependence, especially where it results in culturally unique creative
expression, may well qualify as transformative use,1 36 and thus a Digital Entre-
133 Bridgeport Music, Inc., 383 F.3d at 401.
134 Locke Remixed, supra note 101, at 1269-70. ("[T]he romantic narrative of [remix] rebellion
is only one of the stories we need to tell. There are others at least as important, and, on the num-
bers, quite pervasive. This is the workaday story of people trying to make a living at what they
love to do. Not faceless bureaucrats at Walt Disney or Sony Records, but real-live musicians and
songwriters, novelists and film industry workers, people who actually send the kids off to school
and go to work 'making content.' They may work in groups large or small, designing. sketching,
brainstorming or they sit down in their kitchen or small studio and try to write a new song, or edit
a script, or lay out a website. as a way to make a living. This narrative call it 'trying to make a
go of life in the digital media industries' - is no less compelling than the romantic story of resis-
tance and rebellion. But it is a story not told often enough (in my view) in the pages of academic
journals, or even the popular press.").
135 See, e.g.. Schultz & van Gelder, supra note 70, at 81 82 ("We advocate specific, pragmatic
reforms that could remove obstacles to using copyright to benefit local creative industries. Most
discussions about intellectual property and development tend to center on high-level, somewhat
abstract debates about technology transfer, relations between rich and poor countries, the fairness
of the international intellectual property system, and concerns about distributive justice. The poli-
cy initiatives that get the most attention occur at the level of international institutions like the
World Intellectual Property Organization (WIPO) and the World Health Organization (WHO).
Whatever the merits of these debates, they do not focus on making the most of the available local
resources and the laws that countries already have. One would do well to focus also on specific
reforms that could use copyright and creative industries to help poor people by removing obstacles
at the local level. A virtue of this bottom-up approach is that resource-constrained policymakers
need not embrace broad, expensive solutions. Nor is success contingent on the presence of an
advanced technological, physical, educational, or financial infrastructure. Indeed, we contend that
government can best support creative sectors primarily by providing a stable legal foundation and
business environment. This role in fostering an enabling environment is crucial, but creators and
creative industries can and must do most of the work. Ultimately, success will come from unleash-
ing the genius and initiative of individuals. The focus on grass-roots solutions is in keeping with
much recent thinking on development, which calls for more context-specific. results-oriented.
entrepreneurial projects that empower locals."); see also Birgitte Andersen, Zeljka Kozul-Wright
& Richard Kozul-Wright, Copyrights, Competition, and Development: The Case of the Music
Industry, U. N. Conf. on Trade and Dev., Discussion Paper No. 145, 2 (2000), available at http:/
www.unctad.org/en/docs/dp 145.en.pdf.
136 See Campbell, 510 U.S. at 579; Rogers. 960 F.2d at 309 ("The first factor... asks whether
the [work was used] in good faith to benefit the public or primarily for the commercial interests of
the infringer."); Cynthia M. Ho, Attacking the Copyright Evildoers in Cyberspace, 55 SMU L.
REV. 1561, 1573 (2002) ("The legal nuances attendant to fair uses in teaching and research are far
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preneurialism bent on Fair Use could support a socially significant but otherwise
limited intrusion upon the commercial market for a copyrighted work. 137 Prop-
erly embraced by the bench and bar, Digital Entrepreneurship analyses and
strategies can help to harvest the full copyright social utility/social justice poten-
tial of digital information technology.
C. Digital Entrepreneurship Legislation: A Flexible Digital Compulsory
License Scheme
While affirmative adoption of Digital Entrepreneurship principles by at-
torneys and judges will promote the exploitation of digital information technol-
ogy in the cause of copyright social utility and social justice, attorney activism
and judicial sensitivity alone will not entirely resolve the digital copyright social
utility/commoditization conflict. There remain many kinds of socially beneficial
digital uses for copyrighted works that will require the copyright holder's con-
sent, and consequently, some reconciliation of the societal interest in maximiz-
ing copyright exploitation of digital information technology with the preserva-
tion of the exclusive rights incentive mechanism must be achieved. The balanc-
ing of the various constituent interests, however, must be undertaken with prop-
er deference to copyright social utility/social justice interdependence, and with
an eye toward attaining the pragmatic objectives of Digital Entrepreneurship.
There is a growing consensus among legal scholars and commentators
that resolution of the digital copyright social utility/commoditization conflict
warrants Congressional action,138 and various approaches to the problem have
been offered. 139 The congressional response that appears to have the broadest
more complex. Court precedents have banished simplistic assumptions, such as the mythic fair use
assumption that all commercial use is impermissible."); Tasini and Its Progeny, supra note 3, at
373 74 (2004) ("[E]lectronic use and dissemination of printed copyrighted material has yet to be
independently assessed, not merely as a problem of authors' rights and publishers' interests, but as
a question of the public interest and the principal policy objectives of the copyright law.").
137 See, e.g., Suntrust Bank, 268 F.3d at 1270-72, 1274-75 (vacating an injunction enjoining a
critical parody of Gone With the Wind, on the grounds that such a transformative use of the pro-
tected elements of a copyrighted work is permissible under the Fair Use Doctrine).
13s Garon, supra note 18, at 1326-27 ("Congress has the legislative authority to tip the balance
in favor of copyright owners or towards the public on a case-by-case basis. Except for possible
constitutional limitations, Congress can shape the balance across a wide spectrum of issues.");
Tasini and Its Progeny, supra note 3, at 404 05 ("In deciding which uses of copyrighted material
should be relegated to the copyright holder as exclusive rights. Congress has the opportunity to
consider a variety of factors, including the nature of each particular use and the effect that remov-
ing the use from the public enjoyment is likely to have on the underlying objectives of copyright
law."); Thornburg, supra note 18, at 237 ("Copyright law has always grappled with how to adjust
to new mediums of expression. In both the courts and Congress, advances in recording, reproduc-
ing, and distributing copyrighted works have always led to tension in fashioning appropriate me-
chanisms to protect authors without creating an imbalance or unfavorable results.").
139 See, e.g., Free(ing) Culture, supra note 101, at 96; Locke Remixed, supra note 101; Tasini
and Its Progeny, supra note 3, at 404-05 ("The identification of any of exclusive rights simulated
by or incorporated within a new use for copyrighted material is a reasonable method by which to
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following, however, is that of a compulsory license scheme. 140 As discussed in
Part I, a compulsory license typically offers the kind of compromise that can
foster further innovation, 4 and can provide a more efficient means by which to
get copyrighted material in to the hands of grass roots creators, while preserv-
ing the property interests of copyright holders and the ensuing property interests
of their licensees.
While a compulsory license system is preferable to a blanket "digital
free use/reuse" easement, it must be carefully tailored if it is to achieve the
broadest range of copyright social utility/social justice objectives. The greatest
challenge of course is in setting the compulsory license rate: if the rate is set too
high, it could prove a barrier to many socially productive but commercially un-
profitable uses; if it is set too low, it could compromise the interests of individu-
al artists, particularly marginalized artists, and just at the moment that digital
information technology is making artist retention of their ownership and distri-
bution rights viable.
In addition, digital use encompasses the entire spectrum of copyrighta-
ble expression, from printed literary works to cinematic visual works and every-
thing in between. Given the myriad issues and interests at stake, the optimum
compulsory license approach would therefore be one that provides for a flexible,
advisory licensing rate, and that would take into account enumerated statutory
determine the appropriate author/exclusive rights versus public/free access classification for that
new use. It is not, however, the only reasonable method. Another legitimate approach to the new-
use classification problem is to consider the new use as sui generis that is. as an activity unique
and distinguishable from any existing uses, including any exclusive rights that may be simulated
by or incorporated within the new use."): Netanel, supra note 40.
140 See, e.g., Joshua Crum, The Day The (Digital) Music Dies: Bridgeport, Sampling Infringe-
ment, and a Proposed Middle Ground, 2008 B.Y.U. L. REv. 943, 947 (2008) ("[C]ompulsory
license is by far the best solution to the growing problems concerning digital sampling for three
reasons: 1) unlike other proposed solutions, a compulsory license preserves the benefits of the
Bridgeport rule while mitigating its faults: 2) a compulsory sample license is consistent with the
theories underlying copyright protection; and 3) only a compulsory sampling license fulfills the
conflicting goals of copyright"); Kartha, supra note 61, at 239-41; Free(ing) Culture, supra note
101; Tasini and [ts Progeny, supra note 3, at 414, n. 153; Srivastava, supra note 40, at 467-68.
141 See, e.g., MARSHALL A. LEAFFER, UNDERSTANDING COPYRIGHT LAW § 8.30[B] (3d. ed.
1999) (making a similar observation in connection with the Audio Home Recordings Act, 106
Stat. 4247) (codified at 17 U.S.C. §§ 1008-1009); Fagin, Pasquale, & Weatherall, supra note 122,
at 524-26; Srivastava, supra note 40, at 467-68.
142 See Untangling the Web. supra note 8, at 700 ("Today ... we have several different entities
claiming an interest in any given [copyright] activity. Each of those entities backs its claim with
reference to the Copyright Act and the full panoply of legal remedies available. If clearance from
more than one entity is necessary, in addition to high transaction costs, the environment is ripe for
strategic behavior and the potential for holdouts. This is particularly true when you have muddy
rules masquerading as clear entitlements. Even in light of the mechanisms used to reduce those
transaction costs (e.g., compulsory licensing and CROs), the lack of certainty concerning which
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143factors in assessing the appropriate license fee for a particular digital use.
Three such factors are discussed below.
The first factor to be assessed would be the commercial, quasi-
commercial, or non-commercial nature of the use and/or of the underlying copy-
righted work, with commercial uses requiring the highest rate and non-
commercial uses requiring the lowest. Similar to the transformation assessment
available in connection with the first Fair Use factor, this assessment would also
weigh the social importance of the use and of the underlying work. Thus for
example, the use of a factual news report in a historical documentary would
likely be considered a quasi-commercial use, even if both the news report and
the documentary are produced for commercial distribution. 
44
The second factor that would be assessed is the availability of suitable
alternatives to the underlying work, as well as the significance of the portion of
the underlying work being used, both with respect to the underlying work as
well as with respect to the work in which it is being used. Where there are ample
alternatives, a higher rate might be appropriate, because the selection of the un-
derlying work is more likely to be motivated by the desire to capitalize upon
specific expressive aspects of the work. Moreover, in such a situation the user
has the option of choosing a lesser known alternative work, as to which the cop-
yright holder is likely to be satisfied with a smaller license fee (and the opportu-
nity to draw attention to her work). Where the underlying work is both unique
and critical to the use, however, this would militate toward a lower license rate,
143 This is approach is quite similar to the approach that has been used in connection with the
compulsory mechanical license for musical works for decades. See, e.g., Untangling the Web,
supra note 8. at 681 83 ("Currently codified in section 115 of the Copyright Act, the compulsory
license allows recording artists to record what are commonly known in the industry as 'covers'
musical works written by someone else and previously released on an album by a different record-
ing artist. This royalty is owed for each copy manufactured and distributed, regardless of whether
the copy is sold or given away for free. Most creators of phonorecords, however, do not use the
compulsory license mechanism to obtain permission to use musical works. In 1927 the National
Music Publishers Company created the Harry Fox Agency, a wholly owned subsidiary, to issue
and administer mechanical licenses. Harry Fox represents over 27.000 music publishers, who in
turn represent the interests of more than 160.000 songwriters, who own more than 2.5 million
copyrighted musical works. While the creators of most sound recordings do not utilize the statuto-
ry provisions for the compulsory mechanical license, the availability of such a license does affect
the rate paid under a license granted by Harry Fox and the terms of the license. The parties to the
licenses administered by Harry Fox are negotiating in the shadow of the compulsory license that
both parties know could be used instead."); see also Netanel, supra note 40, at 44 (proposing a
similarly flexible levy on the sale of consumer products and services whose value are substantially
enhanced by P2P file sharing).
144 As evident from Fair Use jurisprudence, not all commercial uses are equal; the mere fact
that an unauthorized use can or does generate commercial revenue should not completely over-
shadow any significant social good that flows from the use. For purposes of assessing a digital
compulsory license rate, commercial use with significant social value should be considered a
quasi-commercial use entitled to a lower license rate. This compromise is consistent with both the
Fair Use Doctrine and the intellectual property empowerment objectives of Digital Entrepreneur-
ship.
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to prevent exorbitant "holdouts," particularly where the use is of important so-
cial value.
The third factor that would be assessed would be the apparent applica-
bility of public use doctrines such as Fair Use and de minimis use, as well as any
pertinent authors' rights doctrines such as moral rights. 145 The availability of a
compulsory license should not be used to curtail the public's right to engage in
use of copyrighted material at no cost. Only where there is reasonable doubt as
to the applicability of a public right or privilege should the option of a minimal
compulsory license fee be resorted to, in order to avoid litigation to resolve the
dispute. Of course, where an unauthorized use of copyrighted material is clearly
outside the realm of legitimate public use, the compulsory license mechanism
should be invoked to enable the use.
146
Finally, the compulsory license scheme should include an express un-
conscionability provision, 141 which could be invoked by either party. In some
cases, a party might demand an unreasonably high (or low) license rate, abusing
the existence of the compulsory scale to gain unfair leverage. While the fact that
the requested license rate falls within the parameters of the compulsory scale
would carry a presumption of fairness, that presumption should be rebuttable.
Even where one party is confident that a requested license rate is grossly unfair
under the circumstances, it may be more expedient simply to capitulate to the
demand. The presence of an express unconscionability provision (with an ap-
propriate damage remedy) specifically tailored toward copyright social utili-
ty/social justice concerns would give negotiating parties reason to rethink unfair
bargaining strategies, and also provide the courts with specific guidance for
assessing the fairness of a license rate under the relevant circumstances.1 48
145 See 17 U.S.C. § 106A. The advent of digital applications for copyrighted material, particu-
larly in the context of a compulsory license scheme, warrants the construction of a more compre-
hensive moral rights mechanism for American copyright law. See Roberta Rosenthal Kwall, Cop-
yright and the Moral Right: Is an American Marriage Possible?, 38 VAND. L. REV. 1 (1985);
Ponte. supra note 119, at 57; Greg Vetter. The Collaborative Integrity of Open-Source Software,
2004 UTAH L REV. 563, 662 82.
146 Here again traditional copyright doctrines would be relevant in determining an appropriate
license rate. The compulsory license should not be deployed as a means by which to undermine
copyright property interests, for example, to enable the duplication and distribution of an entire
work at a cost that will supplant the market for the original work. Such a use would not be permit-
ted under the fourth factor of the Fair Doctrine. Moreover, to the extent that an unauthorized use
conflicts with an artist's moral rights under 17 U.S.C. § 106A, the compulsory license provision
would be inapplicable.
147 See, e.g.. Mathew DelNero. Long-Overdue? An Exploration of the Status and Merit of a
General Public Performance Right in South Recordings. 51 J. COPYRIGHT SoC'Y U.S.A. 473,
514-15 (2004).
148 Once again, this approach borrows from the process already in place for the mechanical
compulsory license. See generally NUARVEvR & NIMMER. supra note 2, at 8.01[B][1]; Untangling
the Web, supra note 8, at 685 ("The practice of pooling thousands of copyrighted musical works
and then offering blanket licenses did not go unnoticed by the Antitrust Division of the U.S. Jus-
tice Department. Lawsuits asserting violations of antitrust laws led to consent decrees that remain
in force today, governing aspects of both ASCAP and BMI licensing practices. One of the re-
[Vol. 112
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CONCLUSION
The ongoing conflict between copyright digital social utility and digital
copyright commoditization has engendered a reemphasis upon the social engi-
neering obligations of the copyright law, and a search for copyright policies
which will reconcile these contemporary copyright tensions. The recognition of
copyright social utility/social justice interdependence harmonizes these compet-
ing objectives, by promoting more equitable access to the copyright infrastruc-
ture and correcting historical problems of copyright social injustice, while at the
same time advancing copyright social utility by producing a more diverse pool
of stakeholders in the copyright property rights sub-regime. Accordingly, the
promulgation of Digital Entrepreneurship and similar copyright social utili-
ty/social justice interdependence initiatives that facilitate grassroots copyright
participation and intellectual property empowerment will not only further the
social justice agenda of the law, but will also preserve the author incentive func-
tion and enhance related copyright social utility mechanisms to accommodate
the digital information age.
quirements of those consent decrees is that a potential licensee may apply to a federal court for a
binding determination of "reasonable" fees in the event that the licensee and the CRO cannot
come to an agreement on the fee to be paid.").
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